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A SKUNK AT A GARDEN PARTY: REMEDIES FOR
PARTICIPANTS IN STATE AND LOCAL PENSION PLANS
RIDGELEY A. ScoTt"
I. INTRODUCTON
Legislators who want to spend more money than is available prefer
to obtain the difference by a method other than raising taxes.' Pension
trusts for public employees are especially inviting because they fre-
quently have substantial assets.2 When legislators remove funds from
pension trusts,3 they leave the trusts in a weakened condition, forcing
fund administrators to make suspect loans.'
The current trend is to make indirect removals.! Approaches include
terminating all6 or part7 of the plan; reducing benefits;8 and, suspending,9
postponing' or reducing" contributions by the employer. Legislators may
also increase contributions by participants.'2 While some of the activities
are accompanied by an explanation, other legislative bodies do not at-
tempt to justify the action.'3
* Copyright @ 1998 Ridgeley A. Scott. Associate Professor, Widener University School of
Law. J.D., Memphis State School of Law, 1967; LL.M. in Taxation, New York University, 1978.
1. Dadisman v. Moore, 384 S.E.2d 816, 828-29 (W. Va. 1988).
2. Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered,
93 COLUM. L. REv. 795,799 (1993).
3. Sklodowski v. Illinois, 642 N.E.2d 1180, 1181-83 (Ill. 1994); Dadisman, 384 S.E.2d at
826; I.R.S. and NJ., Agreement as to Final Determination of Tax Liability and Specific Matters
(Mar. 22, 1996) (on file with author) [hereinafter I.R.S. and N.J.]; A Wobbly California Giant,
ECONOMIST, May 30, 1992, at 75.
4. Withers v. Teachers' Retirement Sys., 447 F. Supp. 1248, 1255-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affd
without op., 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979); Philadelphia Lodge No. 5, Fraternal Order of Police v.
Philadelphia Bd. of Pensions and Retirement, No. 5224 slip op. at 9 (Dec. Term, 1990), appeal
denied, 606 A.2d 603 (Pa. Commw. CL 1992).
5. Romano, supra note 2, at 802-03.
6. Pennie v. Reis., 132 U.S. 464, 471 (1889); A Wobbly California Giant, supra note 3.
7. Calabro v. City of Omaha, 531 N.W.2d 541, 551 (Neb. 1995).
8. Dodge v. Board of Educ., 302 U.S. 74, 75 (1937); Alston v. City of Camden, 471 S.E.2d
174, 176 (S.C. 1996); A Wobbly California Giant, supra note 3.
9. Dadisman v. Moore, 384 S.E.2d 816, 822-23 (W. Va. 1988).
10. Board of Admin. of the Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Wilson, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207,
213-16 (Cal. CL App. 1997).
11. McDermott v. Regan, 624 N.E.2d 985, 986-88 (N.Y. 1993); Kleinfeldt v. New York City
Employees' Retirement Sys., 324 N.E.2d 865, 868-69 (N.Y. 1975); A Wobbly California Giant,
supra note 3.
12. Pennsylvania Fed'n of Teachers v. School Dist., 484 A.2d 751, 752-53 (Pa. 1984).
13. See Dadisman, 384 S.E.2d at 822-23.
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The availability of remedies for participants is uncertain. Where
contributions have been reduced or eliminated, the question is whether
the government has an enforceable obligation to make contributions in an
ascertainable amount. In states which provide express constitutional
protection for pensions,' some courts will enforce the obligation."
State and local governments generally are liable for their agree-
ments under the obligations of the Contracts Clause.'6 Some courts find
there is an enforceable agreement.'" Others have focused on the idea of
permitting legislators to do whatever they would prefer, and go out of
their way to avoid finding a contract.'8
The government cannot take property without due process.'9 Where
there is no contract, the courts usually conclude that participants have a
property interest in the plan. This approach does not provide much com-
fort to participants since most courts conclude that the only requirements
for modifying an interest in a plan is notice and an opportunity to be
heard on a proposed change.'0
Money damages is the usual remedy for a breach of contract or a
taking of property without due process.' Equitable remedies are available
if money damages are an inadequate remedy.22 Executive and legislative
authorities have been ordered to make the contributions necessary to
satisfy actuarial standards.'
The remaining question is the relationship of the participant to trust
funds. Governments frequently argue that they own trust assets because
they contributed the money. 4 This position is nonsense unless the trust
agreement contains an express reservation which permits the government
to recover the funds.'
14. See N.Y. CONST. art. V, § 7.
15. Kleinfeldt, 324 N.E.2d at 868-69; McDermott, 624 N.E.2d at 986-90.
16. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1977).
17. Board of Admin. of the Pub. Employees Retirement Sys. v. Wilson, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207,
226 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
18. Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d 513, 516-17 (Me. 1993); Pierce v. State, 910 P.2d 288, 304-05
(N.M. 1995).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. X1V, § 1.
20. Pierce, 910 P.2d at 304.
21. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRAcrs § 12.4,850 (2d ed. 1990).
22. Id.
23. Dadisman v. Moore, 384 S.E.2d 816, 828-29 (W. Va. 1988); see also Board of Admin. of
the Pub. Employees Retirement Sys. v. Wilson, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207, 216 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997);
Kleinfeldt v. New York City Employees' Retirement Sys., 324 N.E.2d 865, 868-69 (N.Y. 1975).
24. See, e.g., I.R.S. and N.J., supra note 3.
25. GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 42, at
431-33 (2d ed. 1984). See, e.g., Dadisman 384 S.E.2d at 825-26.
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The right to use trust assets is a related problem. Governments may
seek to borrow trust funds because they are unable to borrow elsewhere 6
An alternative is making loans available to others. Governments may
establish programs to develop the local economy 7 and for other socially
conscious reasons.' However, if the funds do not belong to the govern-
ment, the government is not entitled to a preferred status for obtaining
loans, or for making loans available to others.
Government plans that desire the benefits of qualification for tax
purposes must satisfy the pre-Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) qualification requirements. If the government has the right to
modify fund components such as benefits and contributions, the plan
does not qualify since it fails the definiteness requirement. 9 Hence, the
plan is subject to tax on its income,' and holders of vested interests re-
ceive income each time the government makes a contribution to the
plan.
3'
Qualified plans are subject to prohibited transaction rules. The plan
loses its tax exemption32 if loans to the government do not satisfy the
rules. The loan must be based on a bona fide debtor-creditor relationship,
bear a reasonable rate of interest, and be backed by adequate security.
3
The utility of the qualification rules is uncertain because the IRS
usually avoids enforcement actions against government plans' 4 Partici-
pants can sue for a declaration that the plan is not qualified. If the IRS
does not enforce a declaration, participants might be able to force it to
perform its duty?' The greatest prospect of success may be political pres-
26. See, e.g., Withers v. Teacher's Retirement Sys., 447 F. Supp. 1248, 1255-56 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), affd without op., 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979); Philadelphia Lodge No. 5, Fraternal Order of
Police v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pensions and Retirement, No. 5224 slip op. at 9 (Dec. Term, 1990),
appeal denied, 606 A.2d 603 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992).
27. James A. White, Picking Losers, Back-Yard Investing Yields Big Losses, Roils Kansas
Pension System-But Idea of Using Such Funds to Help Local Industries Still Intrigues Politicians-
Now a Steel Mill is Sitting, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 1991, at Al. The idea appealed to the S.B.A.,
which commissioned a report. M&R Assoc., Pension Funds and Small Finn Financing (1995) (on
file with author).
28. Romano, supra note 2, at 810-12; Cindy Skrzycki, The Regulators: Targeting a Pension
Policy To GOP, 'Targeted Investments' Are Just Retiree Robbery, WASH. POST, June 2, 1995, at Fl;
Jim Saxton, A Raid on America's Pension Funds, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 1994, at A12.
29. South Texas Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 764, 767 (1946), affd, 162
F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1947).
30. I.R.C. § 501(a) (1994).
31. Treas. Reg. § 1.402(b)-1(a)(]) (1978).
32. I.R.C. § 503(a)(1)(B) (1994).
33. I.R.C. § 503(b)(1) (1994).
34. Public Employee Pension Benefit Plans: Joint Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on
Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means and the Subcomm. on Labor-Management
Relations of the House Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 98th Cong. 165 (1983) (statement of S. Allen
Winborne, Ass't Commissioner of Internal Revenue) [hereinafter Joint Hearing].
35. I.R.C. § 7476 (1994).
36. See, e.g., Vishnevsky v. United States, 581 F.2d 1249 (7th Cir. 1978).
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sure generated by the possibility that participants will pay taxes on con-
tributions.
The probability that financially troubled governments will continue
to try to solve their problems by reducing or eliminating financial sup-
port for pension programs combined with the uncertainty of enforcement
of those programs underline the need for legislation. Proposals designed
to subject plans to a modest set of definite rules37 have been defeated by
intense lobbying of state and local governments.38
The principal theme has been that the requirements would unneces-
sarily increase the cost of providing pensions. 9 That argument is difficult
to accept since many state and local governments have not taken the
trouble to determine what the cost of their programs might be.' A much
more likely explanation is that legislators do not like the idea of being
forced to make unexpectedly large payments to deliver benefits which
have been promised. Legislators also want to retain the ability to reduce
benefits in order to deal with financial problems.
This article covers the possibilities for enforcement of pension
promises against state and local governments. The discussion begins with
state law actions, continues with tax rules, and ends with the possibility
for legislation analogous to ERISA. The conclusion argues that legisla-




Employees of state and local governments expect pensions because
of their common use as one of the inducements used to attract and retain
employees." Enforcement of the expectation is another matter. State law
frequently is silent about the nature of the interest held by participants, '2
and many courts are reluctant to find enforceable rights.'3
37. See, e.g., H.R. 14138, 95th Cong. (1978).
38. Ridgeley A. Scott, Misuse of Public Pension Assets: White Collar Crimes and Other
Offenses, 26 IND. L. REV. 589, 590 (1993).
39. Id.
40. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESs., PENSION TASK
FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEM 63-64, 180-81 (Comm. Print 1978).
41. Hammon v. Hoffbeck, 627 P.2d 1052, 1056-57 (Alaska 1981); Calabro v. City of Omaha,
531 N.W.2d 541, 548-49 (Neb. 1995); Jaennont v. New Hampshire Personnel Comm'n, 392 A.2d
1193,1196 (N.H. 1978).
42. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK
FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 80 (Comm. Print 1978).
43. See Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d 513 (Me. 1993); Pierce v. State, 910 P.2d 288 (N.M. 1995).
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The classification of pension rights generally is a matter of state
law." Some courts find that pension legislation creates contracts, 5 while
others conclude that interests in receiving benefits are property rights."
Enforcement of property rights may be more uncertain than enforcement
of contract rights.'
Politics is the reason for the lack of agreement over the nature and
extent of the interest of a participant.' Judges who conclude that there is
an agreement which cannot be unilaterally altered '9 are not be sympa-
thetic to legislative problems. Those who find there is no enforceable
right' are not be concerned with the needs of participants. Intermediate
positions reflect attempts to reconcile the competing interests.
The availability of remedies usually is governed by the nature of the
right. The enforcement of contract and property rights generally is lim-
ited to money damages, although circumstances may justify extraordi-
nary remedies such as an injunction.5 The availability of remedies also
may be affected by the fact that the defendant is a government."
B. Plans
There are three general categories of pension rights. One is the terms
and conditions of the plan prior to retirement, which includes the amount of
contributions by the employer and the participant, requirements for receipt
of benefits, and the amount of benefits. 3 Another is the terms and
conditions of the plan after retirement, which includes the amount of
44. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344-47 (1976); see also Alston v. City of Camden,
471 S.E.2d 174, 177-78 (S.C. 1996).
45. Calabro, 531 N.W.2d at 551-52.
46. Pierce, 910 P.2d at 299.
47. Id. at 299-304; Spiller, 627 A.2d at 515-17; Peter Rehon, The Pension Expectation as
Constitutional Property, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 153, 163-67 (1980); Note, Public Employee
Pensions in Times of Fiscal Distress, 90 HARv. L. REV. 992, 1002-03 (1977) [hereinafter Note,
Public Employee Pensions].
48. Kosa v. Treasurer of the State, 292 N.W.2d 452, 454-55 (Mich. 1980); see also Dadisman
v. Moore, 384 S.E.2d 816, 828 (W. Va. 1989).
49. Yeazell v. Copins, 402 P.2d 541, 546 (Ariz. 1965); see also Pennsylvania Fed'n of
Teachers v. School Dist., 484 A.2d 751, 753-54 (Pa. 1984).
50. See Board of Trustees of Firemen's Pension v. Behnnan, 203 P.2d 490, 492-93 (Colo.
1949), overruled in part, Police Pension and Relief Bd. v. McPhail, 338 P.2d 694 (Colo. 1959).
51. See Dadisman, 384 S.E.2d at 829, 832.
52. Musselman v. Governor, 533 N.W.2d 237, 245-46 (Mich. 1995), reh'g granted, 535
N.W.2d 346 (1995), on reh'g, 545 N.W.2d 346 (1996).
53. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK
FORCE REPORT ON PUBuC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 43-46 (Comm. Print 1978); 3 EUGENE
McQunLuN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 12.141-12.172 (3d ed. 1990) (discussing
pensions, benefits, and insurance); Rubin G. Cohn, Public Employee Retirement Plans-The Nature
of the Employees' Rights, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 32 (1968) (criticizing courts' willingness to apply labels
in analyzing pension fund situations); Deborah Kemp, Public Pension Plans: The Need for Federal
Regulation, 10 HAMUNE L. REv. 27, 47-52 (1987) (outlining the characteristics of Public Employee
Retirement Systems).
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contributions by the employer, the amount of benefits, and limitations on
the right to continue receiving benefits.
The third category is rights in plan assets." Participants own a property
right in the assets held in trust.' While this right may achieve protection of
trust assets, 7 it usually is not a ground to force the government to make
adequate contributions." Sometimes the circumstances obligate the trustees
to take legal action to obtain adequate contributions. 9
C. Expectations of the Parties
When state and local governments seek to attract prospective
employees, one of the inducements offered is pension benefits.'
Recruitment materials often describe pensions in terms of the monthly
amount which participants can expect after a certain number of years on
the job.' This leads participants to think that the benefit is part of the
compensation for work performed. 2
Employment contracts confirm the impression that pension benefits
are compensation. 3 Many contracts go further by requiring employee
contributions as one source of funding retirement benefits.' Materials
furnished by the employer to supplement the contracts frequently outline
the terms of the plan including a description of the monthly amount which
participants can expect after a certain number of years on the job.'
Legislators have a different viewpoint. There is little or no advance
planning devoted to the establishment or modification of most retirement
programs.' The atmosphere is political, and problems such as how to pay
the costs or who will pay the costs are not carefully considered.
54. See Lea E. Selleck, Post-Retirement Employment Restrictions on Public Employees in
Kansas, 5 KAN. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 199 (1996).
55. New Jersey claimed it was the owner of the corpus of pension trusts and had the right to
remove assets. I.R.S. and N.J., supra note 3; Scott, supra note 38, at 589.
56. Scott, supra note 38, at 597.
57. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 25, § 42.
58. See Rehon, supra note 47.
59. Dadisman v. Moore, 384 S.E.2d 816, 825-26 (W. Va. 1988).
60. Kern v. City of Long Beach, 179 P.2d 799, 803 (Cal. 1947).
61. See Hammond v. Hoffbeck, 627 P.2d 1052, 1056-57 (Alaska 1981); Jaennont v. New
Hampshire Personnel Comm'n, 392 A.2d 1193, 1195-96 (N.H. 1978).
62. Nash v. Boise City Fire Dept., 663 P.2d 1105, 1107 (Idaho 1983); Duella v. Massachusetts
Bay Transp. Auth., 421 N.E.2d 1228, 1233 n.9 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981).
63. Police Pension and Relief Bd. v. McPhail, 338 P.2d 694, 698-99 (Colo. 1959); Hammond,
627 P.2d at 1056-57; Dadisman, 384 S.E.2d at 829.
64. Pennsylvania Fed'n of Teachers v. School Dist., 484 A.2d 751, 753 (Pa. 1984); McPhail,
338 P.2d at 698-99.
65. Information of this sort frequently is repeated and embellished by benefits officials. See
Alston v. City of Camden, 471 S.E.2d 174, 179 (S.C. 1996).
66. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95T CONG. PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT
ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 80 (Comm. Print 1978).
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Legislators even seem to be unaware of the fact that if one program is made
more generous, participants in other programs will seek similar terms."
Legislative programs generally can be modified at any time.6 Legis-
lators usually avoid expressly committing their successors to continue a
definite program, 69 and they feel free to change their spending priorities
at any time. There may be no legal remedy available to those who lose
all or some of what they were entitled to receive under an existing pro-
gram.70 Faced with budget shortfalls, many legislative bodies have re-
duced contributions' or removed assets from plans to balance their
budgets.2
D. Gifts
Early decisions relied on the feudal doctrine that a pension was a gift
from the king 3 which could be modified or terminated at any time.7'4 After
the Supreme Court suggested that participants acquired a vested interest
when payments became due, 5 many courts concluded there was a mere
expectancy prior to retirement.
Gift classification may make the plan illegal where gifts of public
money are prohibited.' One court avoided the problem by concluding that
pension contributions were payments for services even though the
legislature could modify or terminate the plan at any time.7 '8 Another found
67. Id. at 63-64.
68. Spina v. Consolidated Police & Firemen's Pension Fund Comm'n, 197 A.2d 169, 172-73
(NJ. 1964); Alston, 471 S.E.2d at 177-78.
69. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95Th CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK
FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 80 (Comm. Print 1978).
70. City of Dallas v. Trammell, 101 S.W.2d 1009, 1013 (Tex. 1937). See STAFF OF HOUSE
COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 80 (Comm. Print 1978).
71. Governor Whitman's plan to balance the New Jersey budget and reduce state income taxes
included substantial reductions in state contributions. Bob Herbert, Whitman Steals the Future, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 22, 1995, at A19.
72. Governor Florio removed assets from the New Jersey plan to balance the budget. I.R.S.
and N.J., supra note 3.
73. Hickey v. Pension Bd., 106 A.2d 233, 235 (Pa. 1954). See also Nash v. Boise City Fire
Dep't, 663 P.2d 1105, 1106 (Idaho 1983); see Note, Public Employee Pensions, supra note 47, at
992. The idea is so fantastic that one court observed that the "label 'gratuity' could never have been
taken with sober literalness." Opinion of the Justices, 303 N.E.2d 320, 327 (Mass. 1973).
74. Pecoy v. City of Chicago, 106 N.E. 435,436 (111. 1914).
75. Dodge v. Board of Educ., 302 U.S. 74, 80-81 (1937); Pennie v. Reis., 132 U.S. 464, 471
(1889); see Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
76. Haverstock v. Public Employees' Retirement Fund, 490 N.E.2d 357, 361 (Ind. Ct. App.
1986); Cook v. Employees' Retirement Sys., 514 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
77. See APiz. CONST. art. IX, § 7; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 3,913.
78. Spina v. Consolidated Police and Firemen's Pension Fund Comm'n, 197 A.2d 169, 175
(N.J. 1964).
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that contributions were not donations because they induced state employees
to remain on the job.'
E. State Constitutions
Five states provide express protection for public pension obligations.'
After the New York courts concluded they could be modified or terminated
at any time,' the state constitution was amended to protect pension rights.'
Since an employee received an enforceable right at the moment he became
a participant,. the constitution provided that the legislature could not re-
duce benefits" and contributions,' remove funds from the trust, or order
the trust to make loans to the government.' On the other hand, a federal
court approved a trustee's decision to make suspect loans because failure to
make the loans might cause termination of the plan." This approval may
have been a political decision."
Interpretation of the other constitutions is not uniform. The Illinois
provision was modeled after the New York rule, 9 and the courts found that
the legislature cannot reduce benefits." However, the amount of protection
79. The payments were not classified as payments for services. Fraternal Order of Firemen v.
Shaw, 196 A.2d 734, 736 (Del. 1963).
80. See Darryl B. Simko, Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law of Public Pensions,
State Constitutional Contract Protection, and Fiscal Constraint, 69 TEMPLE L. REv. 1059 (1996).
81. Roddy v. Valentine, 197 N.E. 260,262 (N.Y. 1935).
82. N.Y. CoNsr. art. V, § 7; see McDermott v. McDermott, 507 N.Y.S.2d 390, 396 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1986).
83. Birnbaum v. New York State Teachers' Retirement Sys., 152 N.E.2d 241, 245 (N.Y.
1958).
84. McDermott, 507 N.Y.S.2d at 398-99; Kleinfeldt v. New York City Employees' Retirement
Sys., 324 N.E.2d 865, 868-69 (N.Y. 1975).
85. McDermott v. Regan, 624 N.E.2d 985, 987 (N.Y. 1993).
86. Sgaglione v. Levitt, 337 N.E.2d 592,594 (N.Y. 1975).
87. Withers v. Teachers' Retirement Sys., 447 F. Supp. 1248, 1259 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affd
without op., 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979). The Pennsylvania courts reached the same decision when
Philadelphia was on the edge of bankruptcy. See generally Scott, supra note 38, at 603 (discussing
Philadelphia's fiscal crisis during Mayor Wilson Goode's administration).
88. Marc Gertner, Fiduciary Responsibility of Public Employee and Employer
Representatives, 6 J. OF PENSION PLANNING & COMPLIANcE 83, 94 (1980).
89. Compare ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 5 (stating that membership in a pension or retirement
system of "the State, any unit of local government or school district, or any agency or
instrumentality thereof' shall be an "enforceable contract"), with N.Y. CONST. art. V, § 7 (stating
that membership in a pension or retirement system of "the state or of a civil division thereof" shall
be a "contractual relationship"), People ex rel. Sklodowski v. State, 642 N.E.2d 1180, 1193 (Il.
1994) (recognizing that New York courts consistently interpreted the protections to "shield the
source of funds for benefits not yet realized"), Kraus v. Board of Trustees of the Police Pension
Fund, 390 N.E.2d 1281, 1288 (111. App. Ct. 1979) (recognizing that the illinois legislature was aware
of New York's comparable constitutional provision, but that even then, some legislators were unsure
of the provision's implications). See Loren Oury, Comment, Public Employee Pension Rights and
the 1970 Illinois Constitution: Does Article XIII, Section 5 Guarantee Increased Protection?, 9 J.
MARSHALL J. OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 440 (1976).
90. See, e.g., Felt v. Board of Trustees of the Judges Retirement Sys., 481 N.E.2d 698, 699-700
(1l. 1985).
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is smaller because the funding needed to provide actuarial soundness is not
required,9' and funds can be removed from a pension trust to balance the
budget.92 Hence, the Illinois courts are willing to let political expediency
override the constitution."'
While the Alaska, Hawaii and Michigan constitutions" protect ac-
crued benefits, their courts sometimes permit modifications of conditions
for future benefits." Although Michigan cities must provide adequate
funding,' the requirement is not enforceable against the state because the
courts would not order the legislature to appropriate money.' On the other
hand, Michigan could not transfer funds from a trust to balance the budget."
There are no reported Alaska or Hawaii decisions on the funding issue.
The decisions give the distinct impression that the courts are hostile
to the rules. Most courts are unwilling to force politicians to honor their
commitments even where state constitutions establish substantive rights. '
F. Statute or Ordinance
Rights may be contained in various sorts of legislation. °° Funding
provisions have been upheld where a statute required the governor to keep a
plan financially sound,"' and a home rule charter required a city to keep a
plan actuarially sound.'"
Courts also may enforce funding requirements appearing in the
legislation creating the plan. One statute contractually obligated the
legislature to make monthly payments to the plan,' 3 and another called for
contributions needed to maintain actuarial soundness.'
91. See People exrel. Illinois Federation of Teachers v. Lindberg, 326 N.E.2d 749 (111. 1975).
92. See generally Sklodowski, 642 N.E.2d at 1180 (allowing state officials to transfer money
from pension funds to the state's general revenue fund by refusing to grant beneficiaries' motions
and denying appeal).
93. Id. at 1194.
94. ALASKA CONST. art XII, § 7; HAW. CONST. art. XVI, § 2; MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 24.
95. See Hammond v. Hoffbeck, 627 P.2d 1052, 1057 (Alaska 1981); Chun v. Employees'
Retirement Sys., 607 P.2d 415, 421 (Haw. 1980); In re Enrolled Senate Bill 1269, 209 N.W.2d 200,
202-03 (Mich. 1973).
96. See Shelby Township Police and Fire Retirement Bd. v. Charter Township of Shelby, 475
N.W.2d 249,250 (Mich. 1991).
97. Musselman v. Governor, 553 N.W.2d 237, 246 (Mich. 1995). See generally Allison
Weathersby, Government Law, 42 WAYNE L. REv. 955, 977-85 (1996) (discussing Musselman).
98. Musselman, 533 N.W.2d at 246.
99. Id.; Withers v. Teachers' Retirement Sys., 447 F. Supp. 1248, 1260 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affd
without op., 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979); Gertner, supra note 88, at 94.
100. See generally Kemp, supra note 53 (discussing differences in pension plan benefits).
101. Weaver v. Evans, 495 P.2d 639,649-50 (Wash. 1972).
102. Dombrowski v. City of Philadelphia, 245 A.2d 238 (Pa. 1968).
103. Board of Admin. of the Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Wilson, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207
(Cal. Ct. App. 1997); Valdes v. Cory, 189 Cal. Rptr. 212, 223 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
104. Dadisman v. Moore, 384 S.E.2d 816 (W. Va. 1989).
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Either type of right may be illusory since elected officials may
change legislation without any obligation to continue a former program, or
to continue it on the same terms. Hence, enforcement of a plan may be de-
nied if the legislature modified or repealed the legislation.
Legislation may create an obligation that cannot be unilaterally
altered. The legislation creates this obligation if there is either an express
contract requiring maintenance of the plan, °" or the circumstances are
sufficient to constitute a contract.'" For example, where an employee has
the choice to enter the system, most courts find that this consent creates a
contract right which vests at the time of entry.'" Where the plan requires
participation, many courts conclude there is a mere expectancy prior to
retirement.1
5
The rights under a contract may be less than one might expect. One
court found that the term "contract" was a label meaning that the material
expectations of the employees should in substance be respected." The court
suggested that retirement plans for public employees do not readily submit
themselves to analysis under accepted principles of contract law, which
typically require mutually assenting individuals to form a specific
bargain."0 One of the accepted principles of contract law involves
continuing unilateral offers. An enforceable contract arises between the
person who made the offer and everyone who satisfies the conditions and
accepts the offer."'
The distinction between voluntary and mandatory participation is
difficult to justify. Prospective employers typically offer employment on
specified terms and conditions. If participation in a mandatory pension plan
is part of the arrangement, acceptance of employment constitutes
105. The contract might be an individual employment agreement or a collectively bargained
arrangement for a group of people.
106. Weaver v. Evans, 495 P.2d 639, 648 (Wash. 1972). See generally David Kopilak, Recent
Development, Hughes v. State: Breaching Statutory Contracts Without Violating Oregon's Contract
Clause, 72 OR. L. REv. 487 (1993) (discussing Hughes, where the Oregon Supreme Court held that
PERS was a binding contract between the state and its employees and that such contract included a
statutory state tax exemption).
107. Barden v. Board of Trustees of Judges Retirement Sys., 174 N.E.2d 168, 170 (111. 1961).
But see Haverstock v. State Pub. Employees Retirement Fund, 490 N.E.2d 357, 360-61 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1986).
108. Pierce v. State, 910 P.2d 288, 297 (N.M. 1995). The fact that the employee was required to
contribute to the plan did not change the result. Haverstock, 490 N.E.2d at 360-61.
109. Opinion of the Justices, 303 N.E.2d 320, 327-28 (Mass. 1973).
110. Id.; see Spina v. Consolidated Police and Firemen's Pension Fund Comm'n, 197 A.2d 169,
176 (N.J. 1963) (finding the concept of contract was inadequate and concluding that a pension plan
was merely legislative policy).
111. Oregon State Police Officers' Ass'n v. State, 918 P.2d 765, 773-74 (Or. 1996); 1 ARTHUR
LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 3.9 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1993); SAMUEL
WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 6:31 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 1991).
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agreement to the burdens and benefits of the plan. Hence, the transaction
certainly has the appearance of assent to a specific pension bargain.' 2
Requiring employee contributions"' is an additional ground for
concluding that there is a contract. Where the employee's consent to join
the plan includes an agreement to place part of his pay in the plan, he has
good reason to expect a pension in return for his investment in the plan."'
Suggesting that employee contributions are not contributions because
money is merely transferred from one public account to another"' does not
withstand analysis. Since the transaction would not occur but for the em-
ployee's services, the employee earned the money. The fact that the plan
requires contributions and the money never comes into the possession of
the employee does not change the fact that the employee contributed part
of the compensation to his plan."6
Pension plans usually give a participant credit for his contributions."'
It would be especially difficult to argue that the employee did not make a
contribution if the plan confirms the existence of a benefit to the employee
from his mandatory contributions."8
The general nature of the transaction leads to the same conclusion.
Federal"9 and state'2° tax laws agree that mandatory contributions constitute
compensation, which is taxable to the employee. Several cases involve
federal employees whose wages were reduced by contributions. The fact
the contributions were mandatory and the money was merely transferred
from one public account to another did not alter the government's conclu-
sion that employees received the contributions for state income tax
purposes. '
112. Dryden v. Board of Pension Comm'rs, 59 P.2d 104, 106 (Cal. 1936); Calaboro v. City of
Omaha, 531 N.W.2d 541, 548-49 (Neb. 1995); Oregon State Police Officer's Ass'n., 918 P.2d at
773.
113. Eighty-five percent of employees are required to make contributions. STAFF OF HOUSE
COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 138 (Comm. Print 1978).
114. Hogan v. United States, 513 F.2d 170, 174 (6th Cir. 1975); Police Pension and Relief
Board v. McPhail, 338 P.2d 694, 699-701 (Colo. 1959); Witte v. Director of Revenue, 829 S.W.2d
436, 441 (Mo. 1992).
115. Pennie v. Reis., 132 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1889).
116. McPhail, 338 P.2d at698-701; Hogan, 513 F.2d at 174; Witte, 829 S.W.2d at441.
117. An interest in an ERISA plan must always be 100% vested for accrued benefits from
employee contributions, while benefits from employer contributions may be less than 100% vested.
I.R.C. § 41 l(a)(l)-(2) (1994).
118. Zwiener v. Commissioner, 743 F.2d 273, 275-76 (5th Cir. 1984); Feistmen v.
Commissioner, 63 T.C. 129, 133-34 (1974), appeal dismissed on procedural grounds, 587 F.2d 941
(9th Cir. 1978).
119. Zwiener, 743 F.2d at 274-75; Cohen v. Commissioner, 543 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1976).
120. Borthwick v. Veatch, 38 Haw. 188 (1948).
121. Bemknopf v. Commonwealth, 425 A.2d 880, 882 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981); Kjer v.
Wisconsin Dept. of Taxation, 24 N.W.2d 604,606 (Wis. 1946).
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Economic benefit is the justification for the income tax rule.'2 Even if
the employee can never acquire possession of the money,' 3 receipt of a
benefit such as an increase in pension rights'24 is a sufficient receipt to
justify a tax.
The effect of tax motivated arrangements is unclear. Under a salary
reduction agreement, the participant agrees to a salary reduction in
exchange for the employer's payment of a contribution in order to avoid
income tax withholding." A pick up arrangement reaches the same result
because there is no withholding when the employer pays the employee's
contribution."
The argument that the employee does not make a contribution is not
convincing. While the agreements are effective to avoid current
withholding2' and income'" taxes under special statutes, the receipt is
taxable under the general rules.' 9 Since it is clear that the employer agreed
to make the contribution for the employee, the payment should be treated as
received by the employee.
G. Contract
Where a plan creates contract rights, the question is the extent to
which enforcement is available.' 3 States which find that plans constitute
contracts but deny enforcement'3 ' probably do so to avoid the prohibition on
gifts of state money while also avoiding enforcement.
Other states go to the opposite extreme by prohibiting any change. A
typical situation involves an increase in mandatory employee
contributions and a decrease in benefits after an employee commences
participation. In one case, the court concluded that the terms of the pension
122. Canron Corp. v. City of New York, 674 N.E.2d 1117, 1121 (N.Y. 1996); Humble Oil &
Refining Co. v. Calvert, 478 S.W.2d 926, 930 (Tex. 1972).
123. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
124. Zwiener, 743 F.2d at 275-76; Feistmen v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 129, 133-34 (1974),
appeal dismissed on procedural grounds, 587 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1978); Witte v. Director of
Revenue, 829 S.W.2d 436, 441 (Mo. 1992); Kjer, 24 N.W.2d at 606; Bernknopf, 425 A.2d at 882.
125. I.R.C. § 3401(a)(12)(A) (1994); University of N.D. v. United States, 603 F.2d 702, 703
(8th Cir. 1979).
126. I.R.C. § 414(h)(2), § 3401(a)(12)(A) (1994); Rev. Rul. 77-462, 1977-2 C.B. 358.
127. I.R.C. § 414(h)(2), § 3401(a)(12)(A) (1994); University of N.D., 603 F.2d at 703-06; Rev.
Rul. 77-462, 1977-2 C.B. 358.
128. I.R.C. § 402(a) (1994); Rev. Rul. 77-462, 1977-2 C.B. 358.
129. A contribution to a vested account in a nonexempt pension trust is taxable. I.R.C. §
402(b)(1) (1994); Zwiener, 743 F.2d at 275-76; Feistmen, 63 T.C. at 133; Wine, 829 S.W.2d at 441;
Bernknopf, 425 A.2d at 882; Kjer, 24 N.W.2d at 606.
130. See generally Note, Public Employee Pensions, supra note 47, at 998-1003 (arguing that
contract doctrine offers limited guidance to courts in accommodating the interests of pensioners and
the government).
131. City of Dallas v. Trammell, 101 S.W.2d 1009, 1013-14 (Tex. 1937). Refusing to provide a
remedy probably is an improper impairment of the obligation of contract. United States Trust Co. v.
New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.17 (1977).
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were established when participation began and they could not be
unilaterally modified. ,32 This interpretation entitles the employee to
receive pension payments based on the benefit formula in force when the
employee commenced participation.'33
There are intermediate positions which attempt to compromise
between the contractual rights of employees and the desire for flexibility.
The California version grants limited contractual rights at the moment a
participant enters the system.'34 The right prevents repeal, and modifications
are permitted'35 if they are reasonable.'" A modification is reasonable if it
has a material relationship to the operation of the pension system. and any




Cases construing the Contract Clause' 39 generally permit legislation to
be changed. The Supreme Court concluded that legislative programs
usually can be repealed or modified'" because state and local governments
typically have the sovereign right to change their spending priorities at any
time. The right to change financial arrangements is limited if a statute is
considered a contract between the government and private interests.'
Impairments are upheld if they are reasonable and serve an important
public purpose. However, the mere fact that a government would prefer to
spend the money for the public good does not justify an impairment of its
financial obligations. The impairment must be compared with other means
132. The court concluded that pension rights "vest" at the moment a participant receives a
legally protected interest. Calabro v. City of Omaha, 531 N.W.2d 541, 550 (Neb. 1995).
133. Yeazell v. Copins, 402 P.2d 541, 546 (Ariz. 1965); Pennsylvania Fed'n of Teachers v.
School Dist., 484 A.2d 751, 752-53 (Pa. 1984).
134. Board of Admin. of the Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Wilson, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207,
230 (Cal. 1997); Dryden v. Board of Pension Comm'rs, 59 P.2d 104, 105-06 (Cal. 1936).
135. One opinion suggested that the pension statute included an implied right to make
reasonable modifications. Kern v. City of Long Beach, 179 P.2d 799, 802-03 (Cal. 1947). Another
concluded that the employee contracted for a substantial pension, and he was presumed to have
acquiesced to reasonable modifications. Bakenhus v. City of Seattle, 296 P.2d 536, 540 (Wash.
1956).
136. Wallace v. City of Fresno, 265 P.2d 884, 886 (Cal. 1954).
137. Allen v. City of Long Beach, 287 P.2d 765, 767 (Cal. 1955).
138. Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 326 P.2d 484, 488-89 (Cal. 1958).
139. "No State shall ... pass any... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts .. " U.S.
CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; see G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L.
REv. 433 (1993); Barton H. Thompson, The History of the Judicial Impairment "Doctrine" and Its
Lessons for the Contract Clause, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1373 (1992).
140. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960); Pennie v. Reis., 132 U.S. 464 (1889).
141. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451,
465-66 (1985); United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1,21-25 (1977).
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of serving the public purpose, and any benefits received by the other party
to the contract.1
2
One court applied the impairment criterion to a pension plan where a
state changed the timing of contributions from monthly to annually 12
months in arrears. 3 The court determined that the state financial problems
did not justify the arrears approach to contributions.'" In another case, a
city repealed part of a plan because of financial problems." The repeal was
rejected because the city failed to provide any evidence that a less drastic
measure would not deal with the financial problem, and the disadvantage
was not offset by another benefit.'"
I. Detrimental Reliance
A contract sometimes will be implied from the circumstances. The
party to be charged must have made a promise that a reasonable person
would expect to induce action or forbearance. A contract arises if it does
induce the action or forbearance and enforcement is necessary to avoid
injustice.'" Reasonable people can differ about whether particular
circumstances are adequate to justify application of the doctrine.
One case involved an employee who elected to join a municipal
pension plan, and retired with 23 years of service.'" Payments were
suspended after the state enacted a minimum age requirement.'" The court
observed that a pension was promised without mention of a minimum age
requirement, and that the employee relied on the promise when he elected
to join the plan." Once he elected to become eligible for benefits, the state
was estopped to deny his right to those benefits. 5 '
142. United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 28-32; Board of Admin. of the Public Employees'
Retirement Sys. v. Wilson, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); see Stephen F. Befort, Public
Sector Bargaining: Fiscal Crises and Unilateral Change, 69 MiNN. L. REV. 1221 (1985); Stewart E.
Sterk, The Continuity of Legislatures: Of Contracts and the Contracts Clause, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
647 (1988); Recent Case, Constitutional Law-Contract Clause-Fourth Circuit Upholds City's
Payroll Reduction Plan As a Reasonable and Necessary Impairment of Public Contract-Baltimore
Teachers Union v. Mayor, 107 HARv. L. REV. 949 (1994).
143. Wilson, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2dat213.
144. Id. at 242. Similar ploys have been rejected by other states. See McDermott v. Regan, 624
N.E.2d 985 (N.Y. 1993).
145. Calabro v. City of Omaha, 531 N.W.2d 541 (Neb. 1995).
146. Id. at 551-52.
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
148. Christensen v. Minneapolis Mun. Employees' Retirement Bd., 331 N.W.2d 740, 742
(Minn. 1983).
149. Id. at 742-43.
150. Id. at 749.
151. Id.; see also Law Enforcement Labor Servs., Inc. v. County of Mower, 483 N.W.2d 696,
701 (Minn. 1992). On the other hand, reliance on reemployment criterion in effect at the time of
retirement did not create an implied contract. Retired Adjunct Professors v. Almond, 690 A.2d 1342,
1345 (R.I. 1997). See generally Case Note, Public Employee Pension Benefits-A Promissory
Estoppel Approach, 10 WM. MrTCHELL L. REV. 287 (1984) (discussing Christensen v. Minneapolis
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J. Property
Since a participant has a right to benefits,' 2 his interest in a pension
plan is a property right'" which cannot be taken without due process.'4 State
courts have concluded that due process is satisfied by notice and an
opportunity to be heard on proposed changes to pension arrangements.'"
Whether due process"' requires compensation is unclear. Elimination
or reduction of a pension right certainly appears to be a taking of property
for use by the government. If the change is not an actual taking, the issue is
whether governmental action amounted to a taking.' Although regulations
which prevent all economically viable use is a deemed taking of land, the
Supreme Court suggested that a change which renders personal property
less valuable or even worthless usually does not require compensation.'"
Perhaps the distinction can be justified by the differences between real
and personal property. Because most parcels of land are capable of many
types of productive use, the fact that one or more uses are prohibited
usually does not render a parcel economically useless. If personal property
has only one use, prohibition of that use renders it economically useless.
The expense of requiring compensation for that sort of prohibition might
frustrate many otherwise appropriate regulations.
The fact that the Due Process Clause applies to private property sug-
gests that all property should be given the same treatment.'"9 Attempts to
explain the distinction have produced discussions of issues such as social
Employees' Retirement Bd., 331 N.W.2d 740 (Minn. 1983), where the court reconciled the gratuity
and contract theory approaches to public employee pension ights).
152. Pierce v. State, 910 P.2d 288, 301 (N.M. 1995).
153. Rehon, supra note 47, at 163-67; Note, Public Employee Pensions, supra note 47, at 1003-
05.
154. The Due Process Clause provides that "nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. What constitutes property generally is a matter
of state law. D. Benjamin Barros, Defining "Property" in the Just Compensation Clause, 63
FORDHAM L. REV. 1853, 1865-82 (1995).
155. Pierce, 910 P.2d at 304-05.
156. See Roger Clegg, Reclaiming the Text of the Takings Clause, 46 S.C. L. REv. 531 (1995);
Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45
STAN. L. REV. 1369 (1993); Richard A. Epstein, The Seven Deadly Sins of Takings Law, 26 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 955 (1993); Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature, 45 STAN. L.
REv. 1433 (1993).
157. Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of Lochner: Modern Takings Doctrine and Its Impact on
Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. REV. 605, 655-56 (1996). See generally Margaret Jane Radin,
Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 991-1008 (1982) (discussing takings issues by
using the "rough dichotomy between personal and fungible property").
158. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-28 (1992); see Susan A.
Austin, Comment, Tradeable Emissions Programs: Implications Under the Takings Clause, 26
ENv-rL. L. 323,336, 346 (1996); McUsic, supra note 157, at 655 n.214.
159. Clegg, supra note 156, at 533-34; Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Responsibility, Causation, and the
Harm-Benefit Line in Takings Jurisprudence, 6 FORDHAM ENvTL. L.J. 433,468 n. 178 (1995).
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contract and the expectations of owners,'" forfeitures as a means of
preventing undesirable uses,'6 ' and cases involving endangered species.'62
Several commentators concluded that there is no reasonable basis for
distinguishing real and personal property for due process purposes."
K. Trust
A trust is created whenever a person intends'" that the property will
be held for the benefit of one or more persons.'65 The existence and con-
tinuation of a trust is not affected by the lack of involvement of the bene-
ficiary in the creation and operation of the trust.'" Hence, the fact that the
beneficiary did not know of a proposed trust,'6" did not contribute to it,'"
and did not accept benefits, does not affect the trust.'" Since the identity
of the trustee is irrelevant, the trustee may be the settlor, or his officials
or employees.'"0
Rights to trust property"' are determined by the trust instrument.' 2
The settlor has no further interest in anything conveyed to the trust ex-
cept to the extent of expressly reserved rights. If nothing has been re-
served, the settlor is not entitled to remove assets from the trust, and
has no right to use trust assets. If the settlor is permitted to use trust as-
sets, it must be the result of an arm's length transaction.' 5
160. Richard J. Lazarus, Putting the Correct "Spin" on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1411,1423-25
(1993); William W. Fisher I, The Trouble with Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1393, 1399-1400 (1993).
161. John A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the Takings Clause, 18 COLuiM.
J. ENVrL. L. 1,3-4 (1993).
162. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Takings and
Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REv. 305,328-35 (1997).
163. MARK L. POLLOT, GRAND THEFt AND PETrT LARCENY: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AMERICA
194-95 (1993); Lynda J. Oswald, Cornering the Quark: Investment-Backed Expectations and
Economically Viable Uses in Takings Analysis, 70 WASH. L. REv. 91, 128, 130-31 (1995).
164. AUSTIN WAKEMAN Scor & WILLIA FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 23
(4th ed. 1987); BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 25, § 46.
165. SCOTr & FRATCHER, supra note 164, § 2.3; BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 25, § 1.
166. See ScOrr & FRATCHER, supra note 164, § 14, at 185.
167. See id. § 36, at 385.
168. Id. § 29.
169. Id. § 36.1, at 389-92.
170. Id. § 32.5; see Dadisman v. Moore, 384 S.E.2d 816, 820 n.1, 825-26 (W. Va. 1989).
171. The word property may be defined as a "bundle of rights" associated with a physical thing.
.See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
172. A statute expressly creating a trust presumably will be considered a trust instrument.
Where there is no express trust, the terms of the trust should be inferred from circumstances such as
the statute creating the plan.
173. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 25, § 42.
174. Dadisman, 384 S.E.2d at 827.
175. Compare 29 U.S.C.A § 1103(c) (Supp. 1997), with 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-2 (1996). See
Note, Public Employee Pensions, supra note 47, at 1005-16.
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The ability of beneficiaries to obtain distributions is also determined
by the trust instrument.' 6 Most jurisdictions conclude that a participant
who has retired has an absolute right to accrued payments. However, the
right to any payment due in the future frequently can be modified at any
time before the payment becomes due.'" The trust arrangement may be
modified to the extent permitted by the contract, or due process princi-
ples.
Any beneficiary is entitled to protect his interest by preventing mis-
use of trust assets by the employer.'78 Hence, a participant can maintain
an action to prevent an employer from removing assets, require the em-
ployer to return assets, ' and block other actions such as improper bor-
rowing. "s The duty to preserve trust assets for the beneficiaries may ob-
ligate the trustees to sue to prevent misuse of trust assets. 8
The circumstances may justify relief that goes beyond protecting
assets in the plan. One plan created contractual rights in the beneficiaries,
and the state was obligated to make adequate quarterly contributions.'82
The court found the trustees had a duty to sue the state for failure to
make the contributions and ordered restoration of past contributions as
well as adequate future contributions.' 3 Inadequate protection for the
interests of participants led to suggestions of a need for federal regulation
of the trustee's conduct.' "
176. One court observed that each beneficiary held a "contractually vested property right."
Dadisman, 384 S.E.2d at 827.
177. See generally Selleck, supra note 54, at 205-08 (discussing matters to consider before
making changes in pension benefits).
178. GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 541, at
167 (2d ed. 1993); id. § 543, at 217; see Board of Trustees of the Employees' Retirement Sys. v.
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City, 562 A.2d 720 (Md. 1989); PETER DRUCKER, POST-
CArrALST SOCIETY 75 (1993).
179. Dadisman, 384 S.E.2d at 831. Some courts do permit the employer to remove assets to
balance the budget. See, e.g., People ex rel. Sklodowski v. State, 642 N.E.2d 1180 (11. 1994).
180. Sgaglione v. Levitt, 337 N.E.2d 592, 596 (N.Y. 1975).
181. Dadisman, 384 S.E.2d at 825 n.12. See generally Maria O'Brien Hylton, "Socially
Responsible" Investing: Doing Good Versus Doing Well in an Inefficient Market, 42 Am. U. L. REv.
1 (1992) (focusing on socially responsible investing as practiced by pension funds); Marcia Gaughan
Murphy, Regulating Public Employee Retirement Systems for Portfolio Efficiency, 67 MINN. L. REV.
211 (1980) (proposing a model regulatory scheme for public employee retirement systems);
Romano, supra note 2 (underscoring investment conflicts faced by public pension fund managers).
182. Dadisman, 384 S.E.2d at 832-33.
183. Id. at 825 n.12, 826.
184. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95Tm CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK
FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 187-88, 197-98 (Comm. Print 1978);
Kathleen Paisley, Public Pension Funds: The Need for Federal Regulation of Trustee Investment
Decisions, 4 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 188, 196-206 (1985). See generally DRUCKER, supra note 178,
at 75.
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L. Reappraisal
Using state law to require a government to honor an apparent pen-
sion promise may be impossible. Plans established by private employers
are unenforceable if the circumstances do not justify finding either a
contract or application of the doctrine of detrimental reliance. Govern-
ment plans are subject to the same uncertainties as well as the additional
consideration of politics.
Legislative bodies have a duty to represent all their constituents by
doing whatever is needed for the public good as determined by a major-
ity of the legislators at any particular time. The statement that "a week is
a long time in politics""'8 suggests that politicians should be free to re-
spond to the perceived needs of the community at any moment.
While it is desirable that the political system is able to adequately
respond to changes in circumstances, discretion should not be completely
unlimited. Benefits to society in general or to a group of people should
not unfairly burden particular segments of the community. One com-




Pension plans are not subject to the qualification rules unless the
plan is set up to derive tax benefits. A qualified plan is not subject to tax
on its income, ' and participants are not taxed on employer contributions
until after retirement." However, many plans and participants claim the
benefits even though the plan does not satisfy the requirements for quali-
fication.'
The pre-ERISA qualification rules apply to government plans."
Requirements include'9 ' a plan,"m funding,'93 and holding plan assets in a
185. The statement was made by Prime Minister Harold Wilson. DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE
670(1992).
186. David L. Gregory, The Problematic Status of Employee Compensation and Retiree
Pension Security: Resisting the State, Reforming the Corporation, 5 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 37, 40
(1995); Dadisman, 384 S.E.2d at 829.
187. I.R.C. § 501(a) (1994).
188. Id. § 402(a) (1974).
189. See, e.g., I.R.S. and N.J., supra note 3.
190. H.R. Rep. No. 93-779, at 5 (1974), reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. 248.
191. Additional rules address topics such as the adequacy of participation and vesting, and
prohibit discrimination in contributions or benefits. I.R.C. § 401(a)(3)-(4), (7) (1974).
192. Id. § 401(a)(1).
193. I.R.S. Publication 778, pt. 2(b) (Feb. 1972), reprinted in 3 STAND. FED. TAx REP. (CCH)'
§ 2605.70 (1973), replacing Rev. Rul. 69-421, pt. 2(b), 1969-2 C.B. 59.
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trust"' which expressly prohibits diversion of assets for an improper pur-
pose.95 Certain transactions between the trust and the employer are pro-
hibited.' The IRS does not require an advance determination" that a
new plan or an amendment to an existing plan satisfies the qualification
rules.'" The consequences of failure to qualify are so drastic that most
employers want advance approval."' The fact that many officials have
little or no idea of what the rules are' suggests that most state and local
plans do not consider obtaining approval.
The principal problem with qualification rules is lack of enforce-
ment. The IRS has shown little interest in enforcing the qualification
rules." The fact that participants are permitted to obtain a judicial decla-
ration of whether the plan is qualified' may not be helpful since there is
no reasonably reliable method for enforcing a declaration. Political pres-
sure to obtain the tax benefits of qualification may produce the desired
result.
B. Government Plans
Government plans are exempt from the labor portion of ERISA,n
and are subject to the pre-ERISA tax qualification rules.' The plan must
be "established" or "maintained" 2" by a government' for its employees.'
194. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(a)(1) (1972).
195. Id. § 1.401-2(a)(2) (1964).
196. I.R.C. § 503(b) (1974).
197. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(e)(1) (1972); Tech. Info. Rel. 1195 (Aug. 24, 1972), reprinted in 7
STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) § 6902 (1973).
198. Treas. Reg. § 601.201(o) (1997). Determination letters on qualified plans are sufficiently
important to rate a separate set of instructions which are updated annually. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 97-4,
1997-1 I.R.B. 96.
199. 2 BORIS BrI-KER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES &
GIFrs § 61-11 to-12 (2d ed. 1990).
200. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK
FORE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 77-78 (Comm. Print 1978); I.R.S. and
N.J., supra note 3.
201. Joint Hearing, supra note 34, at 165; STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH
CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 33-
35 (Comm. Print 1978); see S. REP. NO. 92-634, at 97 (1972).
202. I.R.C. § 7476(a) (1994).
203. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) (1994).
204. H.R. REP. NO. 93-779, at 5 (1974), reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. 248. A few of the original
ERISA qualification roles apply to government plans. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR,
95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
30-35 (Comm. Print 1978); see S. REP. No. 92-634 (1972). Some ERISA modifications apply to
government plans. See I.R.C. § 401 (a)(26) (1994).
205. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32) (1994). Although the tax definition requires that the plan be
established and maintained, the IRS apparently has concluded that the requirement is satisfied if the
plan is established or maintained. Feinstein v. Lewis, 477 F. Supp. 1256, 1260 (S.D.N.Y. 1979),
affd, 622 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1980); I.R.C. § 414(d) (1994); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 79-09-037 (Nov. 28,
1978), modified, Priv. Litr. Rul. 79-35-040 (May 29, 1979); see Priv. Lt. Rul. 91-10-048 (Dec. 12,
1990); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-10-029 (Dec. 9, 1996).
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Administrators do not have a consistent approach to applying the
"established" or "maintained" requirement.2' The Labor Department feels it
is satisfied if the employer either contributes funds to the plan or has a
significant involvement in the administration of the plan. ' The IRS
considered several enumerated criteria and other relevant factors, and has
indicated that one of the most important factors is the degree of control the
government has over the everyday operations of the plan.2 '
If the government establishes the plan and there is no change in the
circumstances, the plan is always a government plan."' Governments
frequently hire private concerns such as insurance companies to operate
plans. If the government remains in overall control, it is still a government
plan." ' If a private plan becomes the responsibility of a government, it
becomes a government plan at the moment of the change."' Similarly, a
government plan becomes a private plan at the moment it becomes the
responsibility of a private corporation." '
C. Definiteness
1. The Plan
The plan must be in writing which expressly sets forth the terms and
conditions of the essential features such as benefits.2 ' The terms and
206. The term "government" means a state, a political subdivision of a state, or an agency or
instrumentality of a state or political subdivision. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32) (1994); I.R.C. § 414(d)
(1994); Rose v. Long Island R.R. Pension Plan, 828 F.2d 910, 917-18 (2d Cir. 1987). Compare Rev.
Rul. 89-49, 1989-1 C.B. 117, with Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-41-040 (July 20, 1995).
207. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32) (1994); I.R.C. § 414(d) (1994). Compare DOL Advisory Op. 80-50A
(1980), with DOL Advisory Op. 86-24A (1986), and Rev. Rul. 89-49, 1989-1 C.B. 117 (stating that a
govermental plan may be defined as one established pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement).
208. Commentators have suggested a need for more definite criteria for identifying when an
organization is a government. See Ellen P. Aprill, Excluding the Income of State and Local
Governments: The Need for Congressional Action, 26 GA. L. REv. 421, 480-87 (1992); Phillip
Marchesiello, Note, Federal Tax Immunity for State-Related Organizations: Michigan v..United
States, 49 TAX LAW. 429, 437-42 (1996).
209. DOL Advisory Op. 79-83A (1979). Compare DOL Advisory Op. 80-16A (1980), with
DOL Advisory Op. 86-23A (1986). Application of the criterion to multi-employer plans is more
complicated. See DOL Advisory Op. 83-36A (1983), revoked by DOL Advisory Op. 85-03A (1985).
210. Compare Rev. Rul. 89-49, 1989-1 C.B. 117, with Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-05-027 (Nov. 5, 1996),
and Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-41-040 (July 20, 1995), and Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-29-038 (April 27, 1995).
211. Rose v. Long Island R.R. Pension Plan, 828 F.2d 910,917-18 (2d Cir. 1987).
212. Roy v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 878 F.2d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 1989). See generally
Silvera v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 884 F.2d 423 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that a group benefits policy
purchased by the city for employees was a "governmental plan," although the plan was offered and
administered by a private insurer).
213. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 79-09-037 (Nov. 28, 1978), modified by Priv. Ltr. Rul. 79-35-040 (May 29,
1979); see also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-10-029 (Dec. 9, 1996); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-10-048 (Dec. 12, 1990).
214. Hightower v. Texas Hosp. Ass'n, 65 F.3d 443, 449-51 (5th Cir. 1995).
215. Engineered Timber Sales, Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 808, 827 (1980); Rev. Rul. 74-
466, 1974-2 C.B. 131; I.R.S. Publication 778, pt. 2(f) (Feb. 1972), reprinted in 3 STAND. FED. TAX
REP. (CCH) 2605.70 (1973), replacing Rev. R0I. 69-421, pt. 2(f), 1969-2 C.B. 59 at 63.
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conditions must be communicated to the employees"6 so that they
understand their relationship to the plan as well as to ensure that the plan is
enforceable.'
The exact extent to which the plan must be enforceable is unclear. The
possibility that a right to terminate the plan will be exercised usually does
not affect the qualification of the plan."8 However, alteration of the
essential features of the plan is another matter. Since the employer may not
retain the right to modify the essential features, "9 the employer cannot make
a change that is less favorable to participants. The IRS and participants
presumably would not object to amendments that are favorable to
participants.
Several recent decisions conclude that state and local governments
may retroactively modify the essential features of plans.20 The existence of
this power means the plan is not qualified because it fails the definiteness
requirement."'
2. Pension Benefits
A pension plan2 must provide definitely ascertainable retirement
benefits. " Benefits are not definitely ascertainable if they are subject to the
discretion of the employer." Some recent decisions conclude that legisla-
tive bodies may reduce benefits whenever they choose to do so. " If legis-
latures can reduce benefits to suit political expediency,26 they are not
definitely ascertainable.
216. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(a)(2) (1972); Rev. Rul. 72-509, 1972-2 C.B. 221; Rev. Rul. 71-90,
1971-1 C.B. 115.
217. G & W Leach Co. v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (P-H) 988, 990, 992 (1981); Engineered,
74 T.C. at 827.
218. The possibility of termination does affect the qualification of the plan if the circumstances
suggest that the employer did not expect the plan to be permanent. Engineered, 74 T.C. at 822;
Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(2) (1972).
219. Lichter v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1111, 1118-20 (1952), acq., 1952-1 C.B. 3, aff'd per
curiam, 201 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1952); South Tex. Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 7 T.C.
764, 767-68 (1946), afftd, 162 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1947).
220. See Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d 513 (Me. 1993).
221. Lichter, 17T.C. at 1118-20; South Texas, 7T.C. at767-68.
222. Any plan is considered a pension plan if benefits are to be paid over a period of years after
retirement, and contributions can be determined either actuarially, or are fixed without being geared
to profits. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1 (b)(1)(i)-(ii) (1972).
223. Id. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i); Rev. Rul. 71-24, 1971-1 C.B. 114.
224. I.R.C. § 401(a)(25) (1994); Rev. Rul. 74-385, 1974-2 C.B. 130.
225. See Spiller, 627 A.2d at 513.
226. Leslie Scism, Coming Up Short: Public Pension Plans Are So Underfunded That Trouble
is Likely: Many States and Localities May Have to Cut Benefits or Raise Taxes Sharply: Some
People Delay Retiring, WALL. ST. J., April 6, 1994, at Al.
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3. Funding
Unfunded plans have never satisfied the requirements for
qualification."" Hence, a promise that the employer will pay benefits
directly to the employee fails the funding requirement." The employer
must make regular and substantial contributions. to a fund in an amount
needed to pay current and near future benefit payments.m
A plan may be considered terminated if the employer suspends or
reduces contributions. Unless the plan satisfies objective criteria, whether
termination has occurred is to be determined by examining the facts and
circumstances." A suspension of contributions is not a discontinuance if
the amount of benefits are never affected, and a minimum funding standard
is satisfied."2 It usually is satisfied by contributions equal to the present
cost of future benefits earned during the year plus interest on the past
service cost."
Continuing problems led to several statements that funding should be
required," and the requirement was upheld." The fact that IRS
enforcement practices were inadequate was underlined by the mass loss
of benefits when the underfunded Studebaker plan was terminated. " The
227. Trebotich v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 326, 333-36 (1971), affd, 492 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir.
1974); S. REP. No. 70-960, at 21-22 (1928), reprinted in 1939-1 (pt. 2) C.B. 423-24; H.R. CONFR.
REP. No. 70-1882, at 12 (1928), reprinted in 1939-1 (pt. 2) C.B. 445-46.
228. Rev. Rul. 71-91, 1971-1 C.B. 116 (1971).
229. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(2) (1972).
230. Compare Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,813 (Aug. 16, 1976), with Trebotich, 57 T.C. at 334-36.
231. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-6(c)(1) (1963).
232. Id. § 1.401-6(c)(2)(i). The unfunded past service cost never exceeds the unfunded past
service cost as of the date the plan was established, plus any additional past service or supplemental
costs added by amendment. Id. § 1.401-6(c)(2)(ii).
233. PRESIDENr's COMM. ON CORPORATE PENSION FUNDS, PUBLIC POLICY & PRIVATE
PENSION PROGRAMS 49-50 (1965); Regina T. Jefferson, Defined Benefit Funding: How Much Is Too
Much?, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 8 n.35 (1993).
234. Funding was not a distinct topic in the formal IRS qualification guides issued prior to
1961. Funding was a separately stated requirement beginning in 1961. I.R.S. Publication 778, pt.
2(b) (Feb. 1972), reprinted in 3 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) J2605.70 (1973) replacing Rev. Rul.
69-421, pt. 2(b), 1969-2 C.B. 59, at 62, replacing Rev. Rul. 65-178, pt. 2(b), 1965-2 C.B. 94, at 98-
99, replacing Rev. Rul. 61-121, pt. 2(f), 1961-2 C.B. 65, at 72, replacing Rev. Rul. 57-163, 1957-1
C.B. 128. A funding safe harbor was added to the regulations in 1963. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-6(c)(2)
(1963).
235. Trebotich, 57 T.C. at 332-34.
236. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON CORPORATE PENSION FUNDS, PUBLIC POLICY & PRIVATE
PENSION PROGRAMS 51 (1965).
237. H.R. REP. NO. 93-807, at 13 (1973), reprinted in 1974-3 (Supp.) C.B. 248; S. REP. No.
92-634, at 71-72, 75 (1972); Leigh Allyson Wolfe, Is Your Pension Safe? A Call For Reform of the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation and Protection of Pension Benefits, 24 Sw. U. L. REV. 145,
145-46 (1994).
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Studebaker episode was one of the major causes for the enactment of
ERISA.28
Political pressure motivated Congress to exempt government plans
from the ERISA funding rules. 9 Although governments argued that the
taxing power was a functional substitute for the funding rules, several
congressional reports note instances where taxes probably could not be
raised enough to pay the promised benefits.2"
Congress compromised by exempting government plans and ordering a
study. Congress went even further by emphasizing that the termination safe
harbors were not to become requirements for governmental plans.24 ' Hence,
those that do not satisfy the safe harbor are to be judged under the facts and
circumstances. 2 Although the study concluded that funding rules were
needed,4 3 state and local governments successfully lobbied against them."
D. Trust
Contributions and other assets of the plan must be held in a trust.
2"
Government plans frequently do not satisfy this requirement because the
mere holding of assets in an employer's account is unsatisfactory.2" The
assets must be held by an organization which is independent of the
employer. 7 Some cases conclude that the trust requirement is satisfied if
assets are held by an organization such as an independent corporation."
The assets must be the property of the trust at least to the extent
needed to satisfy all of its liabilities.249 The trust instrument' must provide
238. George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: Reformulating the Federal Common Law for Plan
Interpretation, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 955, 975 (1995).
239. H.R. REP. No. 93-779, at 90, 163 (1974), reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. 333, 406; H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 93-1280, at 291 (1974), reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. 452; S. REP. No. 93-383, at 67 (1973),
reprinted in 1974-3 (Supp.) C.B. 146.
240. H.R. REP. No. 93-779, at 90.
241. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 93-1280, at 291.
242. Id.
243. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESs., PENSION TASK
FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 179-81 (Comm. Print 1978).
244. See generally Public Employee Pension Benefit Plan: Hearings Before the Ways & Means
Comm., 98th Cong. 1138 (1984) (presenting the statement of Mr. Hawkins of the Committee on
Education and Labor).
245. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(a)(1) (1972); Rev. Rul. 72-14, 1972-1 C.B. 106. See I.T. 4102,
1952-2 C.B. 173, 174 (treating civil service retirement and disability fund as a qualified trust).
246. Rev. Rul. 71-91, 1971-1 C.B. 116; see S. REP. No. 75-1567, at 24 (1938), reprinted in
1939-1 (pt. 2) C.B. 796.; S. REP. NO. 70-960, at 21-22 (1928), reprinted in 1939-1 (pt. 2) C.B. 423-
24; H.R. CONFR. REP. No. 70-1882 at 12 (1928), reprinted in 1939-1 (pt. 2 ) C.B. 445-46.
247. D.J. Lee, M.D. Inc., v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 291, 297-99 (1989), affd, 931 F.2d 418
(6th Cir. 1991); Gillis v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 11, 16-17 (1974); Trebotich v. Commissioner, 57
T.C. 326, 333-34 (1971).
248. See Tavannes Watch Co. v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1949); South Penn Oil
Co. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 27 (1951), nonacq., 1952-2 C.B. 6.
249. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-2(b) (1964); S. REP. NO. 75-1567, at 24(1933).
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that the trust is for the exclusive benefit of the participants and their
beneficiaries,"' and expressly prohibit diversion of assets to any other
purpose." Hence, the fact that the employer has financial difficulties and
needs the money is irrelevant. For example, when New Jersey removed
assets from a trust to close a budget gap, the IRS found the action was
improper.25
E. Prohibited Transactions
The purpose for requiring plan assets to be held in trust is to protect
them from actions of the employer. The prohibited transaction rules provide
additional safeguards by proscribing certain transactions between the trust
and the employer.
The trust generally cannot make loans" to the employer unless there is
a bona fide debtor-creditor relationship,' the trust receives a reasonable
rate of interest,"7 and there is adequate security."5 The security is adequate
if it is reasonably anticipated that the security will prevent any loss of
principal and interest in the event of default on the loan.nsA loan based on
the financial resources of the borrower is not secured 2° unless it qualifies
for an exception.
The security requirement does not apply"' if the trust pays the same
price charged to independent62 purchasers' of obligations and ownership is
250. It is unclear whether the requirement of a trust instrument is satisfied where there is no
writing other than a statute. Perhaps the statute satisfies the requirement if it expressly provides that
the funds shall be held in trust, or if the administrator's express duties are equivalent to those of a
trustee. See Rev. Rul. 69-231, 1969-1 C.B. 118.
251. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-2(a)(1) (1964).
252. Id. § 1.401-2(a)(2)-(3).
253. I.R.S. and N.J., supra note 3.
254. See S. REP. No. 93-383, at 94-96 (1973), reprinted in 1974-3 (Supp.) C.B. 173-75.
255. The term "loan" includes purchasing bonds, debentures, notes, or other evidence of
indebtedness. Treas. Reg. § 1.503(c)(1), § 1.503(c)-1(b) (1976).
256. The trust must be a business-like creditor by doing things such as promptly recording
mortgages and demanding payment of principal and interest when due. Rev. Rul. 73-609, 1973-2
C.B. 187, superseded by Rev. Rul. 81-145, 1981-1 C.B. 350; Rev. Rul. 68-474, 1968-2 C.B. 240;
Rev. Rul. 66-324, 1966-2 C.B. 230, superseded by Rev. Rul. 80-269, 80-2 C.B. 191.
257. The rate is adequate if it is equal to the prevailing rate in the community for similar loans.
Treas. Reg. § 1.503(b)-1(c) ex.(4) (1976).
258. I.R.C. § 503(b)(1) (1994). The security requirement applies to loans by government trusts.
Rev. Rul. 73-586, 1973-2 C.B. 186, superseded by Rev. Rul. 85-114, 1985-2 C.B. 163.
259. The criterion presumably is not satisfied unless the security also covers legal fees and other
costs of dealing with a default. Treas. Reg. § 1.503(b)-1(b)(1) (1976). A loan which is partially secured is
not adequately secured. Id. § 1.503(b)-1 (c) ex.(2).
260. Id § 1.503(b)-l(c)ex.(1).
261. Even if the security requirement does not apply, the obligation must bear a reasonable rate of
interest. Id. § 1.503(e)-1(a)(3).
262. 1& § 1.503(e)-1(b)(3).
263. The exact requirements depend on whether the trust purchased on a market, from an
underwriter, or directly from the employer. IR.C. § 503(e)(1) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1503(e)-2(b)(2-4)
(1976).
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diversified." The trust cannot purchase more than 25% of the outstanding
obligations of the same issue,"5 at least 50% of those obligations must be
held by persons independent of the employer, and no more than 25% of
trust assets can be invested in obligations of relatives of the employer.'
Security is not required if a federal law prohibits pledging over half of
the assets of the employer 7 and the other conditions are satisfied. A trustee
who is independent of the employer must approve the investment" and the
amount lent without receipt of adequate security cannot exceed 25% of the
value of the assets of the trust. 
2
Loans that satisfy the restrictions of the prohibited transaction statute
continue to be subject to the general requirements for qualification. Hence,
they will be examined carefully to determine if the loan is for the exclusive
benefit of the participants and their beneficiaries."'
Trustees of several New York City plans knew that if they purchased
city bonds they would violate the exclusive benefit' and prohibited
transaction rules due to the general unmarketability and high risk nature of
the bonds." Although a special exemption was granted,"3 Congress
emphasized that the exemption was not a precedent for using plan assets to
deal with financial crises if the transaction violated the rules."
F. Taxability of Trust Income
There are two issues to resolve in determining whether a trust is
taxable on its income. The income of qualified plans usually is exempt from
taxation."5 A government plan loses its exemption if the trust enters into a
prohibited transaction" ' or becomes disqualified.'m
Where the exemption has been lost, the question is whether the
government is subject to tax on its income. Suggestions that Congress did
264. Treas. Reg. § 1.503(e)-2(c) (1976).
265. Idt § 1.503(e)-l(b)(4),-2(e).
266. I.R.C. § 503(e)(2) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.503(e)-2(c) to -2(d) (1976).
267. Treas. Reg. § 1.503(f)-1(b)(2) (1976).
268. Id. § 1.503(f)-1(b)(3).
269. I.R.C. § 503(0 (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.503(f)-1(b)(4), -1(d) (1976).
270. Treas. Reg. § 1.503(a)-l(b), (e)-l(a)(3), (f)-l(a)(2) (1976); id. § 1.401-1(b)(5)(ii).
271. Rev. Rul.73-380, 1973-2C.B. 124.
272. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK FORCE
REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RErntEMENT SYSTEM 33-34 (Comm. Print 1978).
273. Pub. L. No.94-236,90 StaL 238(1976).
274. H.R. REP. No. 94-851, at7 (1976).
275. I.R.C. § 501(a) (1994).
276. Id. § 503(a)(1)(B). After the exemption is lost, the trust must apply for reinstatement, which
will be granted if the IRS is satisfied that the trust will not again knowingly engage in a prohibited
transaction. Treas. Reg. § 1.503(c)-1(a) (1976). Reinstatement is effective in the year after the application
was filed. I.R.C. § 503(c) (1994). The trust will be subject to tax for at least one full taxable year. Treas.
Reg. § 1.503(c)-1 (b) (1976).
277. The 501 exemption depends on 401 qualification. I.R.C. § 501(a) (1994).
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not receive the power to tax activities of state and local governments have
been rejected" and the extent of the general exclusion for governmental
income is unclear. One authority suggests that trust income is exempt
because it would be imputed to the government." Others are less certain of
the proper application of the general exclusion.2"
The general exclusion is not available if Congress decides the
transaction is taxable. The prohibited transaction statute applies to pension
trusts of state and local governments and the consequence of a prohibited
transaction is loss of the qualified plan exemption. 8' Since loss of the
exemption is irrelevant unless it makes the income taxable, it is clear that
the income is taxable.'
Congress also decided that state and local government plans are
subject to the pre-ERISA qualification rules. 3 Congress knew that one
consequence of failure to qualify is loss of the qualified plan exemption."
Although Congress was uncertain about whether nonqualified government
trusts were taxable,m a trust would have the burden of proving that it was
entitled to the exemption. It may be impossible for an administrator of a
trust to meet this burden.
G. Enforcement by the IRS
The IRS approach to applying the qualification requirements to
government plans developed over a period of time.2 6 The first substantial
restrictions on qualification were enacted in 194228 and the policy of
applying them to government plans" was published in a 1972 ruling."9
278. See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 519 n.11, 523 n.14 (1988); New York v. United
States, 326 U.S. 572,583-84 (1946); Michigan v. United States, 40 F.3d 817, 822-23 (6th Cir. 1994). See
generally Aprill, supra note 208, at 450-65 (arguing that principles of federalism compel Congress to
revisit tax law).
279. I.R.C. § 115(1) (1994); STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SEss.,
PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEM 31 (Comm. Print 1978).
280. H.R. REP. No. 93-779, at 163 (1974), reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. 406; Aprill, supra note 208, at
480-87; Black, Tax Exenption Issues for Public Employee Retirement Systems, 4 ExEMPT ORG. TAX
REv. 801 (1991). See generally Marehesiello, supra note 208, at 434-42 (summarizing various
approaches); Timothy Philipps, Federal Taxation of Prepaid College Tuition Plans, 47 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 291 (1990) (examining prepaid tuition plans and discussing IRS tax treatment of such plans).
281. I.R.C. § 503(a)(1)(B) (1976). See generally HR. CONF. REP. No. 93-1280 at 307 (1974),
reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. 468 (discussing administration and enforcement).
282. See I.R.C. § 503(c) (1994) (government plan that has lost exemption may claim exemption for
subsequent years); Treas Reg. § 1.503(c)-1(a) to -l(b) (1976) (government plan that has lost exemption is
subject to taxation for at least one tax year).
283. H.R. REP. NO. 93-779, at 5(1974), reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. 248.
284. I.R.C. § 401(a) (1994); H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 3 (1973), reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. 212.
285. H.R. REP. No. 93-779, at 163 (1974), reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. 406.
286. See HR. REP. No. 93-807, at 102-05 (1974), reprinted in 1974-3 (Supp.) C.B. 337-4, S. REP.
No. 93-383, at 106-10 (1973), reprinted in 1974-3 (Supp.) C.B. 185-89.
287. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 165,56 Stat. 862-63 (1942).
288. STAFF OF HOUSE COmm. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SEss., PENSION TASK FORCE
REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEM 33-34 (Comm. Print 1978).
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Although there were occasional instances where plans' and beneficiaries'
were denied the benefits of qualified status, a Congressional Committee
concluded that enforcement was almost non-existent until an enforce-
ment program' began in the early 1970s. It caused a flurry of protests '
and revealed some of the weaknesses in the IRS approach to government
plans.
Favorable rulings and determination letters were issued without
attempting to ascertain whether the plans satisfied the rules.' One of the
inconsistencies backfired when the Chief Counsel concluded the IRS
could not litigate a case involving a discriminatory plan for state judges
because he could not distinguish it from a favorable ruling issued to a
discriminatory plan for federal judges.' 3 This resulted in an announce-
ment by the IRS that it would reconsider the application of the discrimi-
nation requirements' to state and local plans for elected and appointed
officials, and whether those plans were subject to tax on their income.
Apparently improper plans would be treated as qualified until the study
was completed.'m
The study probably was not completed,' and the IRS's claim that it
was avoiding regular enforcement because the impact would fall solely
on the participants' is suspect since private plans have grown steadily
since the enactment of ERISA. While removal of the restrictions would
make more money available to provide benefits, private employers must
either absorb the extra cost or reduce contributions to pay the costs. It is
much more likely that the IRS found that enforcement made many mem-
289. Rev. Rul. 72-14, 1972-1 C.B. 106. Some federal plans obtained rulings at earlier times. See
Rev. Rul. 61-218, 1961-1 C.B. 102 (judges). Others were considered qualified. See Rev. Rul. 56-1, 1956-
1 C.B. 444 (civil service).
290. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK FORCE
REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 34-35 (Comm. Print 1978).
291. Dooley v. United States, 36 A.F.T.R.2d 75-6463 (E.D. Tenn. 1975).
292. Gen. Courns. Mem. 36,813 (Aug. 16, 1976) (citing the auditing guidelines).
293. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK
FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC RETREMENT SYSTEMS 33 (Comm. Print 1978).
294. See Ridgeley A. Scott, Rabbis and Other Top Hats: The Great Escape, 43 CATH. L. REV.
1,25-26 (1993).
295. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,897 (Oct 27, 1976). When considering the plan for federal judges,
the IRS adopted the position of "extreme reluctance to find prohibited discrimination in any
retirement plan of the Federal Government." Gen. Couns. Mem. 32,019 (June 26, 1961).
296. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,897 (Oct 27, 1976) (citing I.R.C. § 401(a)(3-4) (1974) and Dooley
v. United States, 36 A.F.T.R.2d 75-6463 (E.D. Tenn. 1975)).
297. I.R.S. News Release IR-77-1869 (Aug. 10, 1977).
298. The IRS stated that tentative written results had been compiled, but that the matter was
still being studied in 1983. Joint Hearing, supra note 34, at 162, 164.
299. Id. at 165.
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bers of Congress unhappy and decided to forgo enforcement in the inter-
est of promoting better relations with Congress."
The IRS is still not willing to start applying the rules. Twelve years
after the reconsideration began, the IRS announced that discrimination
requirements would apply for 1989.30 The effective date has been post-
poned several times 2 and the current deadline is 1999.0' The ruling on
the plan for federal judges"' is still in force and it is unlikely to be
changed since the IRS does not want to incur the wrath of federal judges
or Congress.' The circumstances suggest that the discrimination rules
will never be enforced against state and local plans.
The other qualification rules are also not regularly enforced. While
state and local plans are subject to requirements such as definiteness,'
participation,' funding," anti-diversion' and financial reporting," ' there
is no evidence indicating they are regularly enforced!" A congressional
committee found that enforcement of the reporting requirement would
have a major impact on public employee retirement systems."'
H. Enforcement by Participants
Participants"3 have the right to bring a Tax Court action '" for a de-
claratory judgment on the qualifications of a plan" ' if there has been an
300. The desire to keep on the good side of Congress was an express consideration in the
decision to approve a discriminatory plan for federal judges. Gen. Couns. Mem. 32,019 (June 26,
1961).
301. Minimum Coverage Requirements, 54 Fed. Reg. 21,441 (1989) (to be codified at 26
C.F.R. pt. 1).
302. See I.R.S. Notice 9236, 19922 C.B. 36
303. The deemed satisfaction approach applies to all plan years beginning before 1999. I.R.S.
Ann. 95-48, 1995-23 I.R.B. 13. Different deadlines are specified for cetain types of plans. For
example, the 401(k) date is October 1, 1997. I.R.S. Notice 96-64, 1996-2 C.B. 229.
304. Rev. Rul. 61-218, 1961-2 C.B. 102.
305. Gen. Couns. Mem. 32,019 (June 26, 1961). The Chief Counsel recommended
reconsideration of the ruling on the plan for federal judges. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,897 (Act. 27,
1976). There is no evidence that the ruling was reconsidered. Id.
306. South Texas Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 764, 767-68 (1946), affid,
162 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1947); Lichter v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1111, 1118-19 (1952), acq., 1952-1
C.B. 3, affd per curiam, 201 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1952).
307. I.R.C. § 401(a)(3) (1974).
308. Rev. Rul. 71-91, 1971-1 C.B. 116; Rev. Rul. 75-505, 1975-2 C.B. 364; Gen Couns. Mere.
36,897 (Oct. 27, 1976), reprinted in 1976 IRS GCM Lexis 420.
309. I.R.C. § 401(a)(2) (1974); Treas. Reg. § 1.401-2(a) (as amended in 1981); I.R.S. and N.J.,
supra note 3.
.310. I.R.C. § 6058 (1994).
311. Joint Hearing, supra note 34, at 165.
312. HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK FORCE
REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 33 (Comm. Print 1978).
313. I.R.C. § 7476(b)(1) - l(d)(2) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.7476-1(b)(1) (1988).
314. There are 2 time limits. If the IRS has not made a decision, a petition cannot be filed less
than 270 days after the application. If the IRS makes a decision and notice was mailed to the person,
that person cannot file a petition more than 90 days after the date the notice was mailed. I.R.C. §
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application for a determination letter."' If the employer did not apply, 3 7 a
participant can seek a determination on the overall plan3 ' or his interest in
the plan. This individual interest application should be adequate since any
determination or failure to make a determination with respect to the
qualifications of a plan apparently satisfies the jurisdictional statute.3 9
A person who seeks a declaratory judgment probably should apply for
his own determination letter. Since the review usually is limited to the
matters which appear in the administrative record, 2' participants should
develop the facts during the administrative proceedings. If the applicant
feels that his position would be strengthened by material from an
application by the employer, this material becomes part of the record if it is
referenced in the participant's application."'
The action may involve review of an IRS decision or failure to make a
decision. Participants may seek a disqualification of the plan for failure to
satisfy initial or continuing qualification requirements.2 Hence, partici-
pants can argue that the plan is not qualified because the plan is not
defmite, 3 the employer has not satisfied the funding requirements," ' or the
employer has removed assets from the trust.ra
Whether a declaration that the plan is disqualified would achieve the
desired result is uncertain. Since state and local governments are not
concerned about expense deductions, that pressure is not present. On the
7476(b)(3, 5) (1976). See generally Federal Land Bank Assoc. v. Commissioner, 573 F.2d 179 (4th
Cir. 1978), on remand, 74 T.C. 1106 (1980) (finding that a notice requirement does not apply if the
plan is not subject to ERISA); Treas. Reg. § 601.201(o)(3)(xiv-xvi) (1976) (finding a requirement
for notice by applicant to interested parties); Treas. Reg. § 1.7476-3 (1976) (finding a requirement
for notice by IRS to applicant and certain interested parties).
315. The term plan includes pension, profit sharing and annuity plans. I.R.C. § 7476(c) (1976).
316. I.R.C. § 7476(a) (1994); Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,417 (Feb. 14, 1978); James J. Clark,
Recent Developments, 42 ALBANY L. REV. 153 (1977); see S. REP. No. 93-383, at 112-16 (1973);
LAURENCE CASEY ET AL., FEDERAL TAx PRACTICE § 639a (rev. ed. 1992); George G. Short, Using
the Tax Court's Declaratory Judgment Procedure to Obtain Plan Determinations, 45 J. TAx'N 90
(1976) (discussing when and how the declaratory judgment procedure may aid ERISA applicants in
securing a favorable plan determination).
317. One study found that over 75% of governmental plans did not apply for an initial
determination, and those that did frequently made changes without requesting approval. STAFF OF
HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT ON
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 33 (Comm. Print 1978).
318. The I.R.S. may refuse to accept an application which is not filed by the employer, a plan
sponsor, or a plan administrator. I.R.C. § 7476(b)(1) (1994).
319. I.R.C. § 7476(a) (1994).
320. TAx CT. R. 217(a); Joseph P. Clawson, M.D., Inc. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (RIA) 799
(1993); Tamko Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 824, 837 (1979), affd, 658 F.2d 735,
738-39 (10th Cir. 1981); H.R. REP. NO. 93-807, at 108 (1974), reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. (Supp.)
343.
321. TAx CT. R. 211(a), (c)(5).
322. S. REP. 93-383, at 115-16 (1973), reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. (Supp.) 194-95.
323. See Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d 513 (Me. 1993).
324. Dadisman v. Moore, 384 S.E.2d 816 (W.V. 1989).
325. I.R.S. and N.J., supra note 3.
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other hand, participants would lose the benefits of qualification. If the
government made a contribution to a vested account, the participant would
be required to report it as income." Taxation of contributions presumably
would cause considerable political pressure.
Another possibility involves forcing the IRS to collect tax on income
of the plan. ' Although the IRS usually is not subject to injunction," a par-
ticipant may obtain injunctive relief if the suit seeks to require the IRS to
perform a duty." Hence, the court may order the IRS to perform if it fails
to perform a ministerial duty." °
The probability of success is not great. An act is not ministerial if it
involves the IRS' discretion."' Since the courts usually try to avoid
interfering with activities of the IRS, and the IRS has express discretion to
compromise civil suits,"2 the courts probably would refuse to force the IRS
to collect the tax from a government plan.
The probability of success may be irrelevant. Suppose the action also
seeks to have the IRS collect tax from every vested participant.333 Political
pressure from the participants, especially those who hold relatively high
office such as legislators and judges, may put the government in such a
difficult position that it will favorably resolve the problem.
326. I.R.C. § 402(b)(1) (1974).
327. One decision concludes that a state-related trust is not taxable unless Congress has
expressly imposed tax. State of Michigan v. United States, 40 F.3d 817 (6th Cir. 1994);
Marchesiello, supra note 208. Results may depend on construction of the statutes. Congress may
have intended to impose tax since governmental plans are subject to the qualification requirements,
and the consequence of failure to qualify is denial of an exemption. A similar argument applies to
denial of exemption because of a prohibited transaction. I.R.C. § 401(a) (1974); I.R.C. § 501(a)
(1994); 503(a)(1)(B) (1994). See generally STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH
CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 34-
35 (Comm. Print 1978) (outlining the consequences in the few instances where the IRS enforced
qualification requirements against public plans).
328. I.R.C. § 7421(a) (1994).
329. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1994); Vishnevsky v. United States, 581 F.2d 1249 (7th Cir. 1978);
Blair v. United States ex rel. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 6 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1925); see Tull v. United
States, 69 F.3d 394 (9th Cir. 1995). See generally John A. Lynch, Nontaxpayer Suits. Seeking
Injunctive and Declaratory Relief Against IRS Administrative Action, 12 AKRON L. REV. 1 (1978)
(arguing that the APA properly permits review of IRS rulings in appropriate circumstances).
330. United States ex rel. Dunlap v. Black, 128 U.S. 40 (1888); United States ex rel. Botany
Worsted Mills v. Helvering, 89 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1937); see Tull, 69 F.3d at 394 (9th Cir. 1995).
331. United States ex rel. Ashley v. Ashley, 3 A.F.T.R. 3420 (D.C. 1917); Murray v. United
States, 585 F. Supp. 543 (D.N.D. 1984), affid, 751 F.2d 271 (8th Cir. 1985).
332. I.R.C. § 7122(a) (1994). The IRS settled a qualification controversy with New Jersey.
I.R.S. and N.J., supra note 3.
333. If the plan is not qualified, a contribution for a vested participant is taxable in the year
when it is received by the plan. I.R.C. § 402(b)(1) (1974).
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I. Recapitulation
State and local government plans seeking the benefits of qualification
are subject to the pre-ERISA qualification rules.33 The plan will be
disqualified if the government does not contribute enough money to fully
satisfy the funding rules every year.3 The fact that the government is not
obligated by statute to make the contribution3" and would prefer to spend
the money on something else is irrelevant.
Assets of the plan must be held by a qualified trust.33 ' If the
government removes assets for any purpose at any time,3 3 the plan will be
disqualified, and trust income is taxable if the trust makes an improper loan
to the government."9 The fact that the government was not obligated by
statute to make the contributions"' and has a desperate need for use of trust
assets is irrelevant.3"'
It is unlikely that the IRS will begin actively enforcing the law. The
IRS always feels it is understaffed and it prefers to use its resources in areas
which are more likely to produce substantial revenue without becoming
involved in political controversies. Hence, the participants and other
interested persons such as unions probably will be the only ones who are
concerned about enforcement.
It is unlikely that interested persons will be able to judicially enforce
the qualification rules. The utility of a declaration that the plan is
disqualified 2 is uncertain because the IRS is reluctant to enforce the law.' 3
A suit to require the IRS to enforce the law' probably would be
unsuccessful since the IRS has discretion to settle civil controversies."
The ability to obtain judicial enforcement of the law may be irrelevant.
If enough people are upset over the consequences of disqualification, they
334. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK
FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 30-35 (Comm. Print 1978).
335. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON CORPORATE PENSION FUNDS, PUBLIC POLICY & PRIVATE
PENSION PROGRAMS 49-50 (1965); P.S. No. 57 (Aug. 5, 1946), reprinted in 3 STAND. FED. TAX
REP. (P-H) § 76,237 (1946); IRS Publication 778, pt. 2(b) (Feb. 1972), reprinted in 3 STAND. FED.
TAX REp. (CCH) 2605.70 (1973).
336. Trebotich v. Commissioner, 492 F.2d 1018, 1025 (9th Cir. 1974).
337. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(a)(3) (1964).
338.. The only exception is when the plan has been terminated. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-2(a)(1)
(1964).
339. I.R.C. § 503(a)(1)(B)-(b)(1), 4975(g)(2) (1994).
340. Trebotich, 492 F.2d at 1025.
341. I.R.S. and N.J., supra note 3.
342. I.R.C. § 7476 (1994).
343. Joint Hearing, supra note 34, at 165.
344. See United States ex rel. Dunlap v. Black, 128 U.S. 40 (1888).
345. I.R.C. § 7122(a) (1994). The IRS settled a qualification controversy with New Jersey.
I.R.S. and N.J., supra note 3.
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presumably will put sufficient pressure on the government to force it to
timely follow the qualification rules.3"
IV. REFORM
A. Introduction
Promises by state and local pension systems may be enforceable if
there is a contract. The contract approach may not provide adequate
protection since many jurisdictions permit modification of a promise."7
Even states which have express constitutional protection frequently find
ways to avoid requiring compliance.3"
Rights are much more uncertain where there is no contract.
Enforcement depends on a denial of due process, which means that
complaints will be upheld only where property has been taken without
compensation. 9 Most courts feel that due process is satisfied by public
notice and an opportunity to be heard on proposed changes."
The IRS can control the conduct of governments by denying tax
benefits. State and local plans are not qualified unless they satisfy the
requirements of pre-ERISA law,3 ' which means that the plan must be
definite and enforceable.352 Since the IRS has shown little interest in forcing
governments to follow the rules,353 it probably will not do anything to
provide assistance to participants.
Several proposals to regulate public pension plans have been defeated.
Horrified at the prospect of being subjected to rules, state and local
governments sent a parade of witnesses to each of the hearings involving
346. New Jersey agreed to settle with the IRS since it had already planned to return assets to the
trust, and wanted to avoid costly litigation. I.R.S. and N.J., supra note 3.
347. See generally Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 326 P.2d 484, 493 (Cal. 1958) (stating that
substitution of a fixed pension for a fluctuating pension is not permissible unless accompanied by
commensurate benefits); Allen v. City of Long Beach, 287 P.2d 765, 767 (Cal. 1955) (invalidating
portion of pension plan which modified pension rights without offering any commensurate
advantages).
348. See People ex rel. Sklodowski v. State, 642 N.E.2d 1180, 1181-82 (Ill. 1994) (involving
transfer of money from pension funds to general revenue fund); Musselman v. Governor, 533
N.W.2d 237, 239-40 (Mich. 1995) (involving an executive order reducing the appropriation to the
public school employees retirement system).
349. See Pierce v. State, 910 P.2d 288, 304 (N.M. 1995) (stating that public retirement plans
create property interests that cannot be taken without just compensation).
350. See Pierce, 910 P.2d at 304 (finding that before the legislature may alter retirement
benefits, it must provide employees and retirees with adequate notice and an opportunity to respond).
351. H.R. REP. No. 93-779, at 5 (1974), reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. 248.
352. South Tex. Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 764, 767 (1946), affid 162
F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1947) (finding that a qualified pension did not exist when the provisions of the
trust agreement are vague and tenuous).
353. See Joint Hearing, supra note 34, at 165; STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR,
95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
34-35 (Comm. Print 1978).
[Vol. 75:2
PARTICIPANTS IN PENSION PLANS
these proposals.35 The representatives of state and local governments
principally argued that there would be a substantial increase in costs which
would cause termination of some plans and reduce the benefits available
under other plans.35
Congress took no action. Although several committee reports
recommended regulation, neither house of Congress passed a bill. After
years of effort, those concerned decided that passage was improbable and
there was no effort to obtain passage after 1984."
B. Legislative Background
An early draft of ERISA did not contain an exemption for
governmental plans.35' State and local governments argued that applying the
statute to their plans was undesirable because they were substantially
different than private sponsors. Many of the problems that led to ERISA
involved employers who had become unable to contribute to their plans.35
State and local governments contended that this problem was not appli-
cable to governmental sponsors since they had the power to tax to raise the
necessary funds.3 Further, they argued that the cost of complying with
unnecessary regulations would lead to termination of some plans and a
decrease in benefits available under other plans.' °
Congress was suspicious of the explanation. Reports suggested that
some governments could not raise taxes enough to pay for the benefits
which they had promised.6 ' Since there was inadequate evidence about
whether the need for regulation would justify the cost, Congress exempted
governmental plans pending completion of a congressional study?' The
report was over 1,000 pages long and concluded that there was ample
justification for regulation of several aspects of governmental plans. 3
The report criticized every phase of pension affairs. Legislative bodies
typically create and modify pension plans with little or no information
about the effect of their actions. ' Instead of seeking data about the
354. For an illustrative sample of witnesses, see Joint Hearing, supra note 34, at 367-71.
355. See id. at 369-70 (statement of the National Association of Counties).
356. See Scott, supra note 38, at 590.
357. See H.R. REP. No. 93-779, at 90 (1974), reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. 333.
358. See H.R. REP. No. 93-779, at 12 (1974). reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. 255.
359. See H.R. REP. No. 93-779, at 90 (1974), reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. 333.
360. See Joint Hearing, supra note 34, at 369-70 (statement of the National Association of
Counties).
361. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK
FORCE REPORT ON PUBuC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 140 (Comm. Print 1978); H.R. REP.
No. 93-779, at 90 (1974), reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. 333.
362. H.R. REP. NO. 93-779, at 90 (1974), reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. 333
363. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK
FORE REPORT ON PuBLIC EMPLOYEE RErREMENT SYSTEMS 81-82, 101, 179, 198 (Comm. Print
1978).
364. See generally id. at 63 (stating that the specialized nature of pensions requires technical
knowledge).
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probable future cost of proposed actions, legislators made decisions based
on the politics of the moment. 5 The fact that taxes could not be raised
enough to pay promised benefits' was no problem if the fact was
unknown. Any thought that financing might become difficult or impossible
was dismissed on the grounds that it would be the problem of a future
legislative body.'
C. PERISA
The congressional study led to several proposals to regulate state and
local governmental plans. They were comparable to some aspects of
ERISA' but they were more modest apparently because committees felt
that governmental plans did not require as much regulation as private plans.
Since the evidence does not support the implication that governmental
workers are less likely to be shortchanged, it is likely that the difference is
based on friendships between federal politicians and those holding state and
local offices.
1. Discrimination
Private plans must make membership available to a fair cross section
of the employer's work force.' The plan generally satisfies this
requirement if an adequate portion of the participants are from the middle
and lower compensation ranges." For example, suppose the only people
who are eligible for a plan are judges. If they are highly compensated,"' the
plan is disqualified unless it is proper to evaluate the plan in combination
with another plan, and the combination has an adequate quantity of persons
in the middle and lower compensation ranges."
Benefits from private plans must be nondiscriminatory."' The rule is
satisfied if all members receive benefits which are an equal percentage of
their pay."" Other formulas may be satisfactory as well. 5 Thus, even if the
plan for judges has adequate membership, it will fail if benefits are
discriminatory. For example, if the benefits for employees who are not
365. Id. at 63-64.
366. See id. at 139-42.
367. See generally id. at 63-64 (stating that legislatures modify one system without regard for
fiscal consequences).
368. PERISA is an acronym for Public Employees Retirement Income Security Act. H.R.
14138,95th Cong. (1979).
369. I.R.C. § 401(a)(4) (1994); id. § 401(a)(3)(B) (1974).
370. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(3) (1972); Rev. Rul. 70-200, 1970-1 C.B. 101.
371. I.R.C. § 414(q) (1994).
372. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-3(f) (1997); Rev. Rul. 61-218, 1961-2 C.B. 102; Gen. Couns.
Mem. 36,897 (Oct. 27, 1976).
373. I.R.C. § 401(a)(4) (1994).
374. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-4(a)(2)(i) (1997).
375. Id. § 1.401-4(a)(2)(iii).
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judges are 5% of compensation and judges receive 10%, the plan for
judges fails because the benefits are discriminatory."'
The nondiscrimination requirements were imposed on private plans
because Congress felt that it should grant tax benefits only if the plan was
sufficiently available to workers. None of the proposals would have applied
a nondiscrimination rule to public plans."
2. Funding
Employers must make adequate contributions to pension plans."'
Studebaker and similar cases convinced Congress that employers should
contribute the amount necessary to cover the present value of future bene-
fits so that funds would be available when benefits were due to be paid
even if the employer went out of business." '
Legislators frequently put off funding to make money available for
other purposes." Since governments do not go out of business and they
have the power to tax, the employer will continue to be accountable to
some extent. However, participants and their beneficiaries may lose all or
some of the promised benefits if taxes cannot be raised enough to pay the
benefits or if legislative authorities are unwilling to eventually fund the
benefits."'
None of the bills would require governments to satisfy a funding
standard.32 Hence, governments would be permitted to use any arrangement
from full funding to pay as you go. Once a funding standard has been
adopted, it would be enforceable by the fiduciary since their duty is to
administer the plan according to its terms.83 However, the bills would not
expressly prohibit modification of the standard in a plan for services
rendered after the date of the change.
3. Modification of Plans
When governments are unwilling to make adequate current
contributions, they frequently decide to reduce their liability by modifying
376. See generally Loper Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 385, 392-93 (1969)
(concluding that disparity between profit-sharing plan for salaried employees and pension plan for
union employees was discriminatory with respect to both contributions and benefits); Rev. Rul. 81-5,
1981-1 C.B. 171 (1981) (finding that disparity in corporate benefits between profit-sharing plan for
salaried employees and pension plan for hourly employees was discriminatory).
377. See H.R. 14138,95th Cong. (1979).
378. I.R.C. § 412(a) (1994).
379. H.R. REP. No. 93-779, at 12-13 (1974), reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. 256.
380. See, e.g., Dadisman v. Moore, 384 S.E.2d 816, 829 (W. Va. 1988) (finding diversion of
earned pension trust fund contributions to general revenue fund unconstitutional).
381. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK
FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETiREMENT SYSTEMS 139-42 (Comm. Print 1978).
382. See H.R. 14138,95th Cong. (1979).
383. See id.
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the terms of the plan.3 4 The modifications usually include retroactive
reductions in benefits."' Attempting to change the terms of a plan after a
benefit has been earned is improper."
Definiteness is a requirement for qualification. Hence, an employer
must delete a reserved right to change the plan, and the terms of the plan
must be published to the employees. 8 7 The IRS requires publication for the
purpose of establishing detrimental reliance as a ground for enforcing the
plan, 3  and a series of decisions conclude that plans subject to change are
not qualified.3'9 ERISA continued the publication requirement' and
established substantial ownership requirements.9
Private plans must make participants the owners of their benefits not
more than seven years after the beginning of participation.' Congress felt
the benefits were earned, and should not be forfeitable after a worker
completed a substantial period of participation in the plan, even if he left
the job or committed a wrongful act. 9'
The effect of the bills on the right to modify plans depends on the
circumstances. Since they require publication of the terms of the plan to
384. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK
FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RHTIREMEtwr SYSTEMS 43-46 (Comm. Print 1978); Gregory,
supra note 186, at 40; Romano, supra note 2, at 802-03.
385. See Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d 513, 514 (Me. 1993) (reviewing statute which reduced
benefits to state employees with fewer than seven years of service).
386. See Rubin G. Cohn, Public Employee Retirement Plans-The Nature of the Employees'
Rights, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 32, 33 (1968) (discussing a split in jursidictions regarding the permanency
of contractual rights within a plan); Selleck, supra note 54, at 205-06.
387. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(a)(2) (1972); Rev. Rul. 72-509, 1972-2 C.B. 221 (determining
that a plan not communicated to employees at the time of establishment does not satisfy the elements
for a qualified plan); Rev. Rul. 71-90, 1971-1 C.B. 115 (permitting substitute methods of informing
employees about a qualified plan).
388. See generally Engineered Timber Sales, Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 808, 827-28 (1981)
(stating that the purpose of a written plan is to inform plan participants of their benefits, rights, and
obligations, and to ensure the plan's enforceability); G & W Leach Co. v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M.
(CCH) 998 (1981) (finding general notice distributed to employees did not satisfy the requirements
for a written plan).
389. See generally Lichter v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1111, 1118-20 (1946), acq., 1952-1 C.B.
3, affd per curiam 201 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1952) (finding that a trust is not qualified if the trustor
reserves the right to alter, modify, or amend the trust provisions); South Tex. Commercial Nat'l
Bank v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 764, 767-68 (1946), affd 162 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1947) (refusing to
allow a trust to be a qualified plan when the trustor retains power to amend the plan).
390. 29 U.S.C. § 1021(a)(1) (1974).
391. Pre-ERISA law required vesting when a participant retired, and when the plan terminated.
I.R.C. § 401(a)(7) (1994).
392. Benefits from employee contributions must always be 100% vested. Benefits from
employer contributions must occur no later than either on completion of the fifth year of service, or
on a sliding scale beginning with completion of the third year and ending with completion of the
seventh year. I.R.C. § 411 (a) (1994). See generally STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR,
95TH CONG., 2D SnSS., PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
87-92 (Comm. Print 1978) (describing different vesting schedules).
393. I.R.C. § 411 (1994).
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participants and provide a federal enforcement right, an attempt to
retroactively reduce vesting, benefits, or funding would be improper.9
Prospective modifications present a different set of considerations.
They would be improper to the extent that state law prohibited the change.
There would be no relief for modifications that did not contravene state law
and only the the definiteness requirement for qualification might prevent
them.
4. Trust
Private employers must deliver contributions to a trust 95 and trustees
are subject to several express duties. The overall rule is that they act solely
for the benefit of participants and their beneficiaries." Hence, any act
which does not benefit the participants is improper.
The arrangements for holding government contributions frequently are
unclear. Where assets are held in a governmental account, politicians and
bureaucrats may feel they are merely another item of state property.3 7 New
Jersey claimed it was entitled to remove assets from a trust since New
Jersey was the owner of the assets.'" However, unless there was an express
right to remove assets, the claim was frivolous.3"
The duties of the fiduciaries are equally uncertain. Statutes frequently
are silent or indefinite about their responsibilities and court decisions may
be similarly vague. ' Where duties are unclear, fiduciaries frequently are
cooperative with the employer' because they are friendly with or feel they
owe a duty to elected or appointed officials.'
The bills established standards for fiduciary conduct which are
patterned after ERISA. Hence, fiduciaries would have been required to act
solely for the benefit of participants and their beneficiaries, and would be
subject to various subsidiary rules aimed at achieving the overall goal. 3
394. See H.R. 14138, 95Th CONG. §§ 102(a), 302(a)(1)(B), 302(e) (1978).
395. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1)(A).
396. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(A).
397. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK
FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 188-92 (Comm. Print 1978).
398. I.R.S. and N.J., supra note 3.
399. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 25, § 42.
400. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK
FORCE REPORT ON PUBUC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 188-89 (Comm. Print 1978).
401. Dadisman v. Moore, 384 S.E.2d 816, 825-26 (W. Va. 1988).
402. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK
FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 71 (Comm. Print 1978).
403. See, e.g., H.R. 14138,95th Cong. § 204(a) (1978).
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The threat of a suit to enjoin improper fiduciary conduct ' could be enough
to force a fiduciary to sue the government for unpaid contributions. '
D. Fate of the Bills
State and local governments were horrified at the prospect of being
subject to federal standards. Even minimal requirements could be a
substantial hindrance to unbridled discretion. Moreover, it is easier to
amend an existing statute than it is to enact the first measure. Establishment
of minimal regulations would tend to focus attention on the problems and
make it easier to adopt additional requirements for the purpose of further
reducing discretion. Politicians decided to conduct a determined campaign
against each of the bills and a parade of witnesses opposed each proposal.'
The principal argument was that any sort of regulation was unjustified
because it would increase the cost of providing pensions. Some of the
arguments were clearly groundless. Suggesting that current funding would
increase costs is the reverse of the truth. The only cost is to make timely
contributions. Making timely contributions reduces the amount the
employer would eventually have to contribute since the money will earn
income while it is in the plan.
Reducing or eliminating the ability to make retroactive changes would
not increase costs. The problem is that governments frequently make
pension arrangements by determining the amount to be paid as a retirement
allowance. Unions and other representative bodies typically are concerned
only with getting large allowances, and legislative officials rarely hear
anything initially about the cost of those allowances.' When the bill
becomes due at some later time, legislative officials frequently seek to
reduce it by making retroactive modifications to the plan.' If those
changes were prohibited, the government would be forced to contribute
amounts in excess of that which is convenient.
Failure to establish the actual cost in advance is not the fault of the
participants who relied on the plan and does not sound like a reasonable
ground to permit governments to avoid their apparent promises. If politi-
cians know they will be forced to honor their commitments, they pre-
sumably will be more responsible about making promises.
Preventing the employer from removing assets from the trust and
making the trustee subject to a duty to act solely for the benefit of
404. See, e.g., id. § 302(a)(3).
405. See Dadisman, 384 S.E.2d at 825-26 (holding that a failure to act in the face of illegal
legislative maneuvers is a breach of fiduciary duty by the trustees of a public employee pension).
406. Scott, supra note 38, at 590.
407. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK
FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 63-64, 180-81 (Comm. Print 1978).
408. Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d 513, 514 (Me. 1993).
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participants should not require any discussion.' Settlors usually cease to
have any property interest in assets contributed to a trust 0 and assets are
placed in a pension trust to increase the probability that participants will be
timely paid in full."'
Government officials frequently see things in a different light. Since
the government contributed the money, the money should be available if
the government needs it for another purpose such as balancing the budget. '
Government officials who act as trustees frequently can not obtain a
reasonably clear idea of their duties, and they usually will willingly do the
bidding of legislative and executive officials.' One court used strong
language to describe the actions of trustees who cooperated in the removal
of assets from a pension trust."" The court wondered why they did not sue
to prevent the removals instead of appearing as defendants."
Governments want to retain their ability to remove assets and
manipulate trustees. Their suggestion that strict rules surrounding retaining
assets and the conduct of trustees would increase costs is illogical. The real
explanation is that it would force governments to make hard choices. When
the funds in pension trusts are not available for other purposes, legislators
are more likely to be forced to either reduce spending or obtain money from
other sources." The fact that some projects would have to be curtailed or
taxes raised or money borrowed is not a reasonable justification for
jeopardizing the payment of benefits which have been promised to
participants.
E. Prospects for Change
Proponents eventually decided that change was unlikely. Committees
adopted several bills between 1978 and 1984, but neither house of Con-
gress passed any of them. Failure to secure favorable action on the 1984
bill was the last straw, and no member of Congress introduced a
subsequent bill.' Hence, state and local governments managed to avoid
even minimal regulation of their retirement plans.
409. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK
FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 183 (Comm. Print 1978).
410. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 25, § 42.
411. See, e.g., D.J. Lee, M.D., Inc. v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 291, 299 (1989), affd, 931 F.2d
418 (6th Cir. 1991).
412. People ex rel. Sklodowski v. State, 642 N.E.2d 1180, 1180-82 (Ill. 1994); Dadisman v.
Moore, 384 S.E.2d 816, 825-26 (W. Va. 1989); I.R.S. and NJ., supra note 3.
413. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK
FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETREMENTr SySTEMS 71 (Comm. Print 1978).
414. Dadisman, 384 S.E.2d at 825 n.12.
415. Id.
416. Id. at 829.
417. Scott, supra note 38, at 590.
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Records of hearings on the bills identify the lobbyists and their public
testimony."" What is unknown is the quantity of personal lobbying by state
and local government officials. The fact that the committees adopted
several of the bills but neither house of Congress passed any of them
suggests that personal lobbying was successful with many members of
Congress.
No effort to secure passage was made after 1984 because it was clear
that Congress was not willing to approve. Since lobbying by state and local
governments has always been successful, another campaign is unlikely
unless there is enough support from the public or interest groups to give it a
reasonable prospect for passage.
The problem has been lack of organization. While interest groups have
been very active in dealing with specific local or statewide issues, there has
been little or no effort to organize a campaign to obtain national legislation.
Hence, Congress concluded that the complaints were not of sufficient
magnitude to justify even minimal regulation of state and local pension
plans.
F. Recapitulation
Unions and other interest groups have merely reacted to problems.
They spent much time and money on litigation and other efforts to deal
with specific state and local situations. '19 However, they have spent little or
no effort to obtain national legislation which could be a much more
effective method of dealing with the immediate problems of their
constituents.
There may be several explanations for their actions. Some are not
interested because they have never had a problem. Others are reluctant to
spend money at times when their arrangements are satisfactory. That may
be especially true if they fear a program could be counter-productive
because it might move legislators to take unfavorable actions against
satisfactory arrangements.
Perhaps their outlook will change when there is a bigger demand for
funds. Whenever there is a depression, governments are more aggressive in
their efforts to finance their budgets without raising taxes. If a sufficiently
large group began to take unfavorable actions against pension arrangements
at the same time, interest groups may decide to promote efforts aimed at
obtaining national legislation.
418. Joint Hearing, supra note 34, at v.
419. See Board of Admin. of the Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Wilson, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d
207 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); McDermott v. Regan, 624 N.E.2d 985 (N.Y. 1993); Pennsylvania Fed'n of
Teachers v. School Dist., 484 A.2d 751 (Pa. 1984).
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V1. CONCLUSION
Politics is the principal concern of legislative bodies. When pension
arrangements are being created or modified, benefits to be paid are
established by criteria such as the amount legislators think would be
attractive to prospective employees and interest groups. There is little or no
thought given to who will pay the bill or how the bill will be paid."'
Legislators usually do not consider payment problems because the
courts do not force them to honor their promises. Refusing to pay because
other demands deserve greater priority would be acceptable if no previous
commitment existed. Once the government commits itself to make future
expenditures and people act in reliance on the commitment, the government
should be required to fulfill the commitment.
While some states force legislators to literally honor their promises,
most permit some changes4 2  and some have no significant restrictions on
changes. One state found there was no contract, and due process was
satisfied since there was notice and an opportunity to be heard on proposed
changes. '
The rules for qualified plans may offer some hope. A plan is not
qualified if the essential terms are subject to modification. 4 The
consequences of a finding that a plan is not qualified could be an effective
weapon. The tax rules have not been a significant factor because the IRS
has been unwilling to undertake significant enforcement activities.' and
there is substantial doubt about the ability of participants and interest
groups to enforce the tax rules.
Results demonstrate that federal legislation is the only possibility for
forcing many legislative bodies to honor their pension promises. The statute
should expressly prohibit retroactive changes, and permit participants,
beneficiaries and representative groups to sue to enforce the plan. ' Further,
benefits should be fully funded in the year they are earned 27 and the funds
should be held in trust.428 Finally, removal of funds by the employer should
420. STAFF ON HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK
FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 63-64 (Comm. Print 1978).
421. Pennsylvania Fed'n, 484 A.2d at 752-53.
422. Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 326 P.2d 484, 488-89 (Cal. 1958); Allen v. City of Long
Beach, 287 P.2d 765, 767 (Cal. 1955).
423. Pierce v. State, 910 P.2d 288, 299-304 (N.M. 1995).
424. South Tex. Commercial Nat'i Bank v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 764, 767-68 (1946), aff d,
162 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1947); Lichter v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1111, 1118-20, acq., 1952-1 C.B. 3,
affid per curiam, 201 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1952).
425. Joint Hearing, supra note 34; STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG.,
2D SESS., PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT ON PUBUC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 34-35
(Comm. Print 1978).
426. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994) (empowering certain persons to bring a civil action).
427. I.R.C. § 412 (1994).
428. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a).
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be prohibited ' 9 and other uses should be limited to arm's length
transactions' which satisfy adequate fiduciary safeguards. 3'
429. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 25, § 42.
430. See Note, Public Employee Pensions, supra note 47, at 1005-16 (commenting on options
available to government when need for funding modifications arise). Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)
(stating that assets of plan are not to inure to the benefit of employer unless within an enumerated
exception), with 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-2 (1996) (providing statutory exemption for services of
office space).
431. 29 U.S.C. § 1104.
